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NOTES
SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL MEASURES IN
STRICT LIABILITY: LATER OPINIONS
AS EVIDENCE OF DEFECTS IN
EARLIER REASONING
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were first proposed, opponents
voiced considerable concern over the possibility that codification would
stultify the development of evidentiary law.' Perhaps to calm that fear, the
drafters specifically provided that the rules should be construed to promote
the "growth and development" of evidentiary law.2 Yet, over the years,
some federal courts have strictly construed the rules, occasionally sug-
gesting that evidentiary precepts must be expressly stated in the rules.'
Such was the case in early opinions addressing the question of whether
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 should apply to actions founded on strict
liability theory.4 More recently, however, there has been a trend among
1. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 1 (3d ed.
1982). The authors noted that the fear of stultification is a common concern when codifica-
tion of any common law body of law is suggested. Id
2. FED. R. EVID. 102, which states: "These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and
proceedings justly determined."
3. Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977).
See also Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1980) (applying a restrictive ap-
proach to rule 407 in a products liability case); Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir.
1977) (reaffirming the conclusion reached in Robbins).
4. See, e.g., Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793. The Eighth Circuit stated that Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 "is, by its terms, confined to cases involving negligence or other culpable con-
duct." Id Refusing to apply the rule to a case premised on strict liability theory, the court
said, "[Tihe doctrine of strict liability by its very nature, does not include these elements."
Id See also Arceneaux v. Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
928 (1981). In Arceneaux, the court held that rule 407 did not apply to a remedial action
that was taken before the accident. While refusing to apply rule 407, the court held that the
evidence was irrelevant because the design change was mandated by federal environmental
standards, rather than by any alleged defect in the fuel tank in question. Because rule 407
specifically requires only exclusion of measures taken "after the event," FED. R. EViD. 407,
the Arceneaux court apparently found that measures taken before the event could not be
excluded based on rule 407.
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the federal circuit courts to interpret rule 407 more liberally.5
Rule 407 prohibits the admission of subsequent remedial measures to
prove "negligence or culpable conduct."6 The rule does not, however, re-
quire the exclusion of evidence "when offered for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment." 7 Essentially a codification of the common
law, rule 407 was adopted with little controversy and was not mentioned in
the congressional committee reports on the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 In
recent years, however, the rule has sparked a controversy that could deter-
mine whether the drafters' goal of encouraging remedial actions will be
realized in products liability cases.9 The initial question is whether rule
407 applies to strict liability actions.'o The answer could affect all products
5. See, e.g., Grenada Steel Indust., Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir.
1983); Hall v. American Steamship Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982); Josephs v. Harris
Corp., 677 F.2d 985 (3d Cir. 1982); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2036 (1982); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.
1980); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080
(1981).
6. FED. R. EvID. 407 states:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when
offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
See infra notes 16-22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the policy considerations
behind the rule.
7. FED. R. EVID. 407. The list of exceptions is not exclusive, but rather illustrative.
Explaining the rationale for exceptions, S. Saltzburg and K. Redden noted: "Even though
the principal argument in favor of the Rule is that it encourages people to make repairs and
thus provides for maximum public safety, this argument is not so strong as to require that
such evidence be excluded no matter what the purpose for which it is offered." S.
SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note l, at 177.
8. AM. JUR. 2D New Topic Service, Federal Rules of Evidence § 407 (1982) (citing ob-
jections of Prof. Schwartz to rule 407 at Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice,
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., Rules of Evidence (supp.), Ser. No. 2, at
303 (1973)).
9. Cf. Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (noting that
distinctions between mass-produced products cases and cases involving products which are
not mass produced would, if accepted, allow evidence of subsequent repair to be introduced
in negligence cases involving mass-produced products). See also infra text accompanying
notes 126-31; see generally Kobayashi, Products Liability Lawsuits-Part 1: Admissibility
Questions and Miscellaneous Evidentiary Developments, 25 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 297, 321-22
(1981) (questioning whether the subsequent remedial measures rule should apply to any
products liability cases).
10. While numerous commentators have noted the controversy surrounding this issue in
recent years, most have concluded that rule 407 is not, and should not be, applicable to
actions founded on strict liability theory. See generally Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 346-47
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liability cases, whether based on negligence, strict liability or warranty the-
ories. " Admission of subsequent remedial measures in strict products lia-
bility cases could portend the demise of rule 407 and its goal of
encouraging repairs in all products liability actions.' 2 Conversely, if the
courts resolve the debate by applying the rule to strict liability suits, the
increasing number of grounds for exceptions to the rule could be stemmed,
sending a clear message to manufacturers and sellers of products that the
public policy of fostering improved safety is alive and that their actions in
enhancing consumer safety will be rewarded rather than punished.' 3
While the federal courts are split on the issue, there appears to be a grow-
ing trend in favor of applying the rule to all types of products liability
cases. 14
This Note will trace the decisions that have considered the admissibility
of subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases based on strict
liability theory. Furthermore, it will analyze the application of rule 407 to
five categories of strict products liability cases: (1) defective design; (2)
defective manufacture (product malfunction); (3) inadequate safety device;
(concluding that decisions admitting subsequent repairs will prevail in strict liability cases
despite the logic of opposing opinions); Note, The Case for the Renovated Repair Rule. Ad-
mission of Evidence of Subsequent Repairs Against the Mass Producer In Strict Products Lia-
bility, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 135 (1979) (suggesting that relevancy and public policy arguments
favor admission of post-accident improvement evidence in strict products liability actions);
but see Weinberger, Caprara Over the Rainbow-New York Grapples with Post-Accident De-
sign Changes in Products Liability Actions, 46 ALB. L. REV. 132 (1981) (suggesting that sub-
sequent design changes are ordinarily inadmissible in strict liability actions except cases
involving manufacturing flaws); Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and Its State Variations:
The Courts Perform Some "Subsequent Remedial Measures" of Their Own in Products Liabil-
ity Cases, 49 UMKC L. REv. 338 (1981) (urging a resolution of the controversy by the
Supreme Court).
I1. While "products liability" refers to the liability of a seller or a manufacturer for an
injury caused by a defect in the article, or the condition of the article regardless of whether
the defect or condition is due to want of due care, BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003-04
(3d ed. 1969) strict liability (absolute liability) is liability imposed for an injury when "no
account is taken of the standard of care exercised." Id at 1224, 7. Thus, although a prod-
ucts action may be based on the element of negligence, negligence is not required to find one
strictly liable.
12. See supra notes 5, 6 & 9.
13. But see Note, The Case for the Renovated Repair Rule, supra note 10 (suggesting
consumer safety is best enhanced by not applying rule 407 to strict liability).
14. As this Note will explore, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that rule 407
does not apply to strict liability actions, although the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits have all applied the rule to strict products liability cases. The
Ninth, Eleventh, and District of Columbia Circuits have not decided the issue, although
some cases from the Ninth Circuit have prevented admission of subsequent repairs in strict
liability actions without relying on rule 407.
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(4) failure to warn of defect; and (5) failure to warn of an unavoidably
dangerous product.' 5 Finally, this Note will examine the trend toward ap-
plication of rule 407 to strict products liability cases in the federal circuit
courts and explain why application of the rule is necessary to advance the
policy objective of improving product safety.
I. THE RATIONALE BEHIND THE RULE
A. Dual Considerations. Limited Probative Value and Public Policy
Require Exclusion
The advisory committee note pertaining to rule 407 articulates "two
grounds" for excluding subsequent remedial measures: remedial conduct
does not constitute an admission of responsibility for a prior accident, and
public policy requires courts to foster "steps in furtherance of added
safety."' 6 Referring to the first reason for excluding evidence of subse-
quent repairs, the Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Evi-
dence stated that the rule is a rejection of the notion that "because the
world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish before."' 7 The
courts have consistently asserted that actions taken with the benefit of
hindsight are not relevant to show what should have been done earlier.' 8
Although this was the "conventional" reason for exclusion under the com-
mon law, the advisory committee noted that, under the federal rule, exclu-
sion of subsequent remedial measures does not rest solely on the limited
relevance of the evidence. '9 Subsequent actions, according to the commit-
tee, might be relevant under the liberal theory of relevance embodied in
the federal rules because it is "possible" to infer an admission of prior fault
from a later remedial measure.2" Thus, the compelling ground for exclu-
15. Some courts have indicated that distinctions can be made depending upon the type
of flaw or failure involved. See, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d at 858 (noting that
distinctions between strict liability and negligence are slight in failure-to-warn cases). But
see Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d at 60 (extending the rationale of Werner to a case
involving both design defect and failure-to-warn of the hazard).
16. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
17. Id (quoting Baron Bramwell in Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R.
(n.s.) 261, 263 (1869)).
18. In one of the earliest cases on the issue of subsequent repairs, the United States
Supreme Court noted, "the taking of such precautions against the future is not to be con-
strued as an admission of responsibility for the past .. " Columbia & Puget Sound R.R.
v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892). E.g., Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803, 805 (2d
Cir. 1975).
19. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note.
20. Id But see Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 887-88 (evidence of subsequent repair or
change has little relevance to whether the product in question was defective at a previous
time and the probative value is outweighed by the danger of confusion).
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sion of subsequent precautionary measures appears to be the second
ground for exclusion: "a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at
least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added
safety." 2 The drafters' concern for improved safety is clear from their
assertion that the social policy of encouraging added safety is a "more im-
pressive, ground for exclusion" than is the limited probative value of the
evidence.22
B. The Extent of the Rule and Its Limitations
The drafters of rule 407 emphasized that courts have traditionally used
the principle of encouraging added safety to exclude evidence of various
subsequent remedial measures, including repairs, the addition of safety de-
vices, revisions in company rules, employee discharges, and design modifi-
cations.23 Furthermore, the advisory committee specifically noted that the
federal rule was framed to cover all such measures calculated to improve
safety.
24
Although rule 407 contains some exceptions to the requirement of exclu-
sion, the explanation of these exceptions indicates that the committee be-
lieved a great degree of relevance is required before the probative value of
the evidence can overcome the strong public policy objective of encourag-
ing improved safety. 25 Safety-improving measures may thus be introduced
to prove "ownership, control, or feasibility" only if those issues are "con-
troverted."26 Similarly, such evidence may be used for "impeachment. "27
But the advisory committee emphasized that a "genuine issue" must be
presented before a court may even consider admitting subsequent remedial
21. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
22. Id.
23. Id The advisory committee note illustrates application of the rule through two
examples from common law. In Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir.
1961), a subsequent design modification was admitted to show that design changes and safe-
guards were feasible. In Powers v. J.B. Michael & Co., 329 F.2d 674 (6th Cir. 1964), subse-
quent warnings put out by a road contractor were used to show that the road was under its
control. Repairs, safety device additons, discharge of employees and changes in company
rules are also listed by the advisory committee as subsequent remedial measures which have
been excluded under the common law. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note. The
note, however, does not suggest that the list is exhaustive, but rather speaks generally of all
-steps in furtherance of added safety." Id.
24. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note. The committee did not include design
modifications in its list of possible subsequent remedial measures, but by illustrating the
scope of the rule with a design modification case, Brown, it suggests that such modifications
fall within the rule. See supra note 23.
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measures.28 Exclusion is "automatic" absent a genuine issue.2 9
The advisory committee did not define the terms "controverted" and
"genuine issue." 3 The committee said that an admission of an issue by
opposing counsel would result in an automatic exclusion of subsequent
remedial measures on that issue.3' The advisory committee note does not
suggest, however, that failure to make an admission means that the issue is
controverted, or that, absent an admission, there should be an automatic
inclusion of the evidence of subsequent repair. Rather, when the evidence
is not automatically excluded, the advisory note stated that "the factors of
undue prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, and waste of
time remain for consideration under Rule 403" before a decision can be
made on the admissibility of a subsequent remedial measure.32
II. THE EARLY CASES: RULE 407 MAY ONLY APPLY IN NEGLIGENCE
ACTIONS
Prior to enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,3 3 the Supreme
Court of California in an unprecedented decision held that the California
evidence rule on the admissibility of subsequent remedial measures 34 was
inapplicable to strict products liability cases. 35 Reasoning that the public
policy considerations behind the rule were not valid in strict products lia-
bility cases, the court in Ault v. International Harvester Co. 36 held that a
plaintiff may use evidence of a subsequent remedial measure to prove
product defect. 37 The Ault court stressed the inapplicability of the goal of
28. Id "The requirement that the other purpose be controverted calls for automatic





33. While the rules were enacted on Jan. 2, 1975, their effective date was actually Jul. 1,
1975, 180 days after enactment. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
34. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West 1966) which states: "When, after the occurrence of
an event, remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously, would
have tended to make the event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is
inadmissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." FED. R.
EvID. 407 advisory committee note cites the California Evidence Code § 1151 as an example
of a comparable state rule, along with Kansas Code of Civil Procedure § 60-451 and New
Jersey Evidence Rule 51. But the California Evidence Code only requires exclusion when a
party attempts to use the subsequent measure to prove negligence or culpable conduct. The
Federal Rule, however, also requires exclusion for proof of ownership, control, or feasibility
when those issues are not controverted.
35. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr.
812 (1974).
36. Id at 114, 528 P.2d at 1149, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
37. Id. at 114, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814. In Ault, the plaintiff was injured
[Vol. 32:895
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encouraging repairs in a case involving mass-produced products. 38 A mass
producer, the court reasoned, would not "risk innumerable additional law-
suits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public image" merely to
avoid admission of the evidence in the first lawsuit. 39 The threat of future
increased liability for failure to remedy a product defect is a sufficient im-
petus to encourage the mass producer to take remedial actions.4" There-
fore, the court concluded, exclusion of subsequent remedial actions only
provides "a shield against potential liability."'"
The Ault court also considered whether the phrase "culpable conduct"
included the actions of manufacturers who were sued under strict liability
theory.42 If the legislature had intended to apply the rule to strict liability,
the court asserted, a phrase without the connotation of "affirmative fault"
would have been used.4 3 The dissent, however, argued that "culpable con-
duct" includes a manufacturer's breach of a legal duty by placing a defec-
tive product in the marketplace." Thus, concluded the dissent, the
language of the rule covered strict liability cases.4"
The Ault court's dual rationale-that the additional impetus of exclu-
sion is unnecessary to encourage remedial action in a products liability
case and that culpable conduct does not apply to strict liability actions-
was followed in early federal circuit court decisions concerning rule 407.46
The Eighth Circuit adopted the Ault rationale in Robbins v. Farmers Union
Grain TerminalAssociation , the earliest circuit court decision to hold rule
407 inapplicable to strict products liability actions.
48
when the vehicle manufactured by the defendant, in which he was a passenger, left the
roadway and crashed. Claiming that the die cast aluminum steering box on the Jeep Scout
was defective and caused the vehicle to lose control, the plaintiff introduced evidence that
three years after the accident the defendant changed the steering box from aluminum to
malleable iron. The trial court allowed the evidence to be introduced during the plaintifis
case in chief. While the Supreme Court of California initially held that the evidence should
not have been admitted in Ault v. International Harvester Co., 10 Cal. 3d 327, 515 P.2d 313,
110 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1973), the court reversed itself upon rehearing, Ault v. International
Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d at 114, 528 P.2d at 1150, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814.




42. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815. But see id. at 124, 528 P.2d at
1155, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Clark, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 118, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
44. Id. at 124, 528 P.2d at 1155, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Clark, J., dissenting).
45. Id
46. See, e.g., Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th
Cir. 1977).
47. 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
48. Id. at 793. While the court cited to Sterner v. United States Plywood-Champion
1983]
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In Robbins, the plaintiff offered evidence of a subsequent warning to
demonstrate that a prior warning was inadequate, thus making the product
defective under the strict liability count.4 9 In addition, the evidence was
offered to demonstrate the feasibility of giving an alternative warning
under the negligent failure to warn count.5" Agreeing with the trial court's
ruling that rule 407 does not apply to causes of action brought under strict
liability theory, the Eighth Circuit held that "[rlule 407 is, by its terms,
confined to cases involving negligence or other culpable conduct."'" Strict
liability, the court stated, does not include either of those issues.5" Quoting
the Supreme Court of South Dakota, the Robbins court stated that in a
products liability case the focus is on the defect in the product, not on any
culpable acts of the manufacturer.5 3 Furthermore, "the pure economics"
of possible mass liability for a defect under strict liability theory obviates
the need for excluding subsequent remedial measures in products liability
cases.5 4 Thus, agreeing with Ault, the appeals court concluded that admis-
sion of subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases would not
violate public policy by deterring remedial actions.55
Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1975) and Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d
1196 (8th Cir. 1973) to support the proposition that rule 407 should not apply to strict liabil-
ity cases, neither of the cases so held. Rather, each of those cases was decided under excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule of 407 which are equally applicable to cases involving
negligence. See infra text accompanying notes 82-118.
49. Robbins, 552 F.2d at 792.
50. Id. The trial court ruled that under the negligence count feasibility had to be con-
troverted before the subsequent remedial measure could be introduced on the feasibility
issue. But the court made no distinction between controversion and failure to admit. The
trial court held that the plaintiff could introduce the subsequent remedial measure to show
feasibility under the negligence count when the plaintiff asked the defendant to admit feasi-
bility and the defendant refused. Id. The Eighth Circuit refused to decide whether failure to
admit was sufficient under rule 407's requirement that feasibility be controverted, but sug-
gested in dicta that it was not. Id at 792 n.8. Addressing that issue, the court said:
In view of the alternative holding that the exhibit was admissible under strict lia-
bility, we need not decide whether the feasibility to give the remedial warning in
1971 was properly controverted by GTA's refusal to admit the same. Seemingly,
plaintiffs request that the defendant admit feasibility, as interpreted by the court,
placed the defendant between the rock and the hard place: GTA was either forced
to openly admit the fact of feasibility to the jury or to allow the plaintiffs to prove
the same. This offered the defendant little choice and it remains questionable that
the issue can thus be 'controverted' within the intent of Rule 407.
Id.
51. Id at 793.
52. Id
53. Id. ("[a] product liability case looks to a defect in the product rather than any culpa-
ble act by the manufacturer") (quoting Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 257 n.7
(S.D. 1976)).
54. Id (quoting Shaff'er, 249 N.W.2d at 257 n.7).
55. Id. (citingAu/t, 13 Cal.3d at 121-22, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16).
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Having decided that the evidence was admissible despite rule 407,56 the
Robbins court addressed the purposes for which the evidence could be
used in a strict liability case.57 Under the strict liability count, the court
held that the subsequent remedial measure was relevant to demonstrate
both the existence of a prior defect58 and that the defect caused the in-
jury.59 Additionally, the evidence was relevant to the issue of feasibility,
including any of the components that are encompassed by that issue: cost,
practicality and technological possibility of marketing a nondefective
product.6 °
56. The Robbins case was brought under both negligence and strict liability theory. Id
at 792.
57. 1d. at 793-95.
58. Id at 794 (purportedly relying on Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam)). The Eighth Circuit noted that the distinction between negligence
and strict liability is that in the former "we are talking about the reasonableness of the
manufacturer's actions in selling the article without a warning," while in the latter "we are
talking about the condition (dangerousness) of an article which is sold without any warn-
ing." Id. at 794-95 n.15 (quoting Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d
1033 (1974)). Moreover, the court noted that the same process is occurring whether the suit is
based upon negligence theory or strict liability theory: "weighing the utility of the article
against the risk of its use." Id The court further noted the similarity between the two theo-
ries: "A way to determine the dangerousness of the article, as distinguished from the seller's
culpability, is to assume the seller knew of the product's propensity to injure as it did, and
then ask whether, with such knowledge, he would have been negligent in selling it without a
warning." Id. (quoting Phillips, 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974)).
If the existence of a defect depends upon whether the manufacturer would have been
negligent to sell the product if he knew of its propensity to harm, then using a subsequent
remedial measure to prove the existence of a defect is equivalent to using the remedial meas-
ure to prove he would have been negligent had he known of the propensity to harm. See the
Sixth Circuit's opinion in Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230,
232-33 (6th Cir. 1980) (equating use of a subsequent remedial measure to prove negligence
with use of a subsequent remedial measure to prove design defect). See also infra text ac-
companying notes 168-80.
59. Robbins, 552 F.2d at 794. The court stated that a subsequent remedial measure
"may provide substantial evidence that with a different instruction the harm would not have
resulted (causation) . I..." Id  Even if that is true, however, the fact that a different in-
struction may not have resulted in the harm sued upon does not mean that the original
instruction caused the harm. Furthermore, while causation has always been an element of
cases based on negligence, causation has never been an exception to rule 407 in negligence
cases.
60. Id. The Robbins court noted that in cases where a product is allegedly made defec-
tive by the manufacturer's failure to give adequate instructions, knowledge of the dangers of
failing to give a particular instruction is not an element of strict liability. Id. at 794-95 n. 15.
The Eighth Circuit also made note of the confusion over this issue. Id. Assuming that
foreseeability of the danger is an element in strict liability, the court said that evidence of
technological possibility "implies knowledge that such instructions could have been used to
make the product safe or, at least, implies that such knowledge could be obtained through
'the application of reasonably developed human skill and foresight.'" 552 F.2d at 794
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment S). Further, the court ob-
1983]
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit did not bal-
ance the probative value of the evidence against its possible negative im-
pact in Robbins.6 The court apparently concluded that a limiting
instruction would adequately remedy any confusion of the issues or
prejudice where the evidence was admissible on the strict liability count
but inadmissible on the negligence count.62
Unfair prejudice was expressly addressed, however, in a subsequent
Eighth Circuit case. In Farner v. Paccar, Inc. ,63 the appeals court found
that although there was a danger of prejudice involved in the admission of
a recall letter issued by a truck manufacturer,64 the risk of prejudice did
not outweigh the letter's probative value.6 5 The letter, according to the
Farner court, was probative of both "the existence of a design defect" and
served, technological possibility is one aspect of feasibility. Evidence of a post-accident
change which tended to demonstrate that an alternative warning was feasible in terms of
cost, practicality and technological possibility would therefore be relevant, the court said.
552 F.2d at 794. The court also noted that the defendant in the Robbins case had admitted
the feasibility of giving an alternative set of instructions. It can be argued that evidence
which tends to prove a point already admitted is, in most cases, a waste of time, and is, in
some cases, offered only for the impermissible purpose of prejudicing the jury. See Hall v.
American Steamship Co., 688 F.2d at 1067. While Federal Rule of Evidence 401's advisory
committee note states that a fact need not be in dispute in order to make a finding of rele-
vance, the note further suggests that in such situations consideration should be given to the
possibility of waste of time and undue prejudice under rule 403. FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory
committee note.
6 1. See Robbins, 552 F.2d at 792-95; but see Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 887-88 (applying
rule 407 to a strict liability case on the dual grounds of policy and low probative value
balanced against the danger of confusion).
62. Robbins, 552 F.2d at 792, 795. The court noted, however, that the defendant failed
to request a limiting instruction or to object to the trial court's failure to give a limiting
instruction. Id at 792.
63. 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977).
64. Id. at 527. Noting that admissions and exclusions of evidence are within the discre-
tion of the trial court, the court found no abuse of discretion. Id at 528.
65. Id. at 527.. Although the court did not specifically mention rule 403, that rule is
applicable to the court's discussion of probative value and unfair prejudice. FED. R. EvID.
403. Addressing the possible negative impact of otherwise relevant evidence, the rule states:
"Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." Id The rule "is designed as a guide for the handling of situations for which no
specific rules have been formulated." Fed. R. Evid 403 advisory committee note. The advi-
sory committee note on rule 403 says, " 'Unfair prejudice' within its context means an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an
emotional one." Id The note further says that "consideration should be given to the prob-
able effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction" in deciding whether evi-
dence should be excluded on the grounds of unfair prejudice. Additionally, the availability
of other means of proof may also be considered, the note says. 1d
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of the manufacturer's "negligent failure to warn of known dangers."-6 6 Ad-
ditionally, the court found that because there was independent evidence of
a spring failure in the plaintiff's truck and in other trucks equipped with
the same suspension system, the danger of prejudice was reduced.67 Simi-
larly, the prejudicial effect was reduced, according to the Eighth Circuit,
because the jury already knew of the recall campaign from the deposition
of a service employee of the seller.68 In addition to discussing the possible
danger of prejudice, the court in Farner reiterated its earlier holding that
rule 407 is not a bar to the admission of subsequent remedial measures in
strict liability actions.
69
The two Eighth Circuit decisions were equally restrictive in their read-
ing of rule 407. Both interpreted the silence of the rule on the issue of
strict liability to mean that the rule does not cover that issue. Although the
Farner opinion may be more thorough in that it addressed the problem of
prejudice, that opinion also suggested an apparent inconsistency. Rule 407
is based on both the low probative value of the evidence and the policy of
encouraging repairs. Yet, the Farner opinion appears to conclude that the
66. Farner, 562 F.2d at 527 (emphasis added). Although the evidence may have been
probative of negligent failure to warn of known dangers, Federal Rule of Evidence 407
requires exclusion of evidence introduced for the purpose of demonstrating negligence, re-
gardless of relevancy. FED. R. EvID. 407.
67. Farner, 562 F.2d at 527. But see FED. R. EvID. 403 (requiring the consideration of
"needless presentation of cumulative evidence" in deciding admissibility). The rule suggests
that probative value should be weighed against considerations of cumulativeness. It does
not suggest that the cumulativeness of evidence reduces the possibility of unfair prejudice.
Id.
68. Farner, 562 F.2d at 527-28.
69. Id. at 527 n.17. In explaining the decision, the court suggested that the policy of
promoting subsequent remedial measures was sufficiently effectuated through the require-
ments of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act which imposes a civil penalty of
up to $1,000 for each violation with respect to each motor vehicle in issue, not to exceed
$800,000 for any related series of violations. Id. at 527 n.16 and accompanying text. That
act requires manufacturers to report known defects in vehicles, and in some cases, requires
recalls of vehicles. Failure to report a known defect is a violation of the act and is subject to
the civil penalties under 15 U.S.C. § 1398(a) (1976 & Supp. 1983). The court further states
that "it is not reasonable to assume that manufacturers will forego improvements in prod-
ucts in order to avoid admission of the evidence of the improvements against them . ..."
562 F.2d at 527. Although the logic of the court's comments with respect to the deterrent
effect of the civil penalties under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act appears
valid, the same argument could be used to suggest admission of evidence of a subsequent
recall in a case involving negligence. Moreover, the court noted that admissions made under
a duty imposed by law may be excluded where the statute expressly makes the communica-
tion confidential, or where such privilege is necessarily implied in order to further public
policy objectives. Id at 526. Nevertheless, the court dismissed the defendant's contention
that the public policy objective of encouraging subsequent remedial measures implied
confidentiality.
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probative value of the evidence is not a valid ground for exclusion, even in
a negligence case.
III. COMMON LAW PRIOR TO THE CODE: DID FARNER AND ROBBINS
MISREAD IT?
While Robbins and Farner were based on a precode line of federal cases,
it is perhaps telling that these precode decisions admitted evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures for reasons other than that the defendant was
sued under strict liability theory.7° Not one of the precode federal deci-
sions cited by Farner and Robbins actually held that the doctrine of ex-
cluding subsequent remedial measures was inapplicable to strict liability
cases. Yet, in each case, strict liability was the theory under which the
action was brought.
The first case in the precode line, Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc. ,71
was decided over five years before the effective date of the Federal Rules
of Evidence.72 In Wallner, a maintenance company repairman was in-
jured when he slipped on a wet and oily floor at a Sara Lee bakery plant
and caught his hand in the exposed drive mechanism of a conveyor belt
manufactured by Thiele Engineering Company.73 The plaintiff alleged
that the oil on the floor came from one of two canisters that were attached
to the conveyor unit and lubricated the drive mechanism. He sued Sara
Lee for negligence, complaining that the bakery permitted oil from the
canisters to spray on the floor; that it failed to install an adequate drainage
system on the conveyor belt; that it failed to properly clean the floor and
that it failed to place guards around the conveyor belt's moving parts.
7 4
70. Eg., Sterner v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Paper, Inc., 519 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1975)
(postmanufacture, postaccident repair is admissible to demonstrate the plaintiffs preac-
cident knowledge); Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam) (sub-
sequent remedial measures are admissible against the party who did not make the repairs
and the policy of encouraging repairs is inapplicable to one who does not make the repairs);
Mahoney v. Roper-Wright Manufacturing Co., 490 F.2d 229 (7th Cir. 1973) (evidence of
postaccident design changes admissible in a strict liability suit to demonstrate feasibility of
alternative design and to demonstrate what the defendant knew or should have known if the
design alternative was available when the product was manufactured or sold); Hoppe v.
Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1973) (subsequent remedial measure is ad-
missible under strict liability count to demonstrate feasibility); Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara
Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969) (remedial measures may be admitted under negli-
gence count to prove control and may be admitted under strict liability count because the
objecting party did not make the repair).
71. 419 F.2d at 1028.
72. The Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on Jul. 1, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595,
88 Stat. 1926 (1975).




The plaintiffs case against Thiele was based on strict liability theory. The
machine, manufactured and designed by Thiele, was unreasonably dan-
gerous, the plaintiff asserted, because of the absence of safety guards and
because of an inadequate drainage system that allowed oil and water to be
sprayed on the floor.
7"
After the accident, Sara Lee placed guards over the three lowest rungs of
the vertical conveyor belt, installed additional lubricators and attached
drain lines to the lubrication system.76 The Seventh Circuit held that pho-
tographs showing the subsequent remedial measures were admissible.77
Specifically, the Wallner court stated that the rule against admission of
subsequent remedial measures was inapplicable to the two defendants in
that case. The court did not require exclusion as to Sara Lee because there
was a "significant dispute concerning who was responsible for the repair
and daily maintenance of the conveyor."7" Thus, under the negligence
count there was a genuine issue of control, the court suggested. Similarly,
the rule was inapplicable to Thiele because Thiele "did not make the
changes in question."79
While the Wailner court did state that postaccident changes are "prop-
erly introduced for any purpose except to demonstrate ...negligence,"
the context of the statement indicated that the court had merely deter-
mined that remedial measures could be used to show who "controlled the
conveyor and possessed a duty to make structural changes. . . ."" More-
over, although the court allowed the subsequent repair to be used against
Thiele, it did so not because Thiele was sued under strict liability theory,
but because Thiele did not make the repair. Noting that the rule is "based
upon the salutary policy of avoiding jury prejudice and encouraging per-
sons to make repairs following an accident," the Wallner court concluded
the rule's policy of encouraging repairs is inapplicable to one who does not
make the repairs."'
As the Wallner court allowed evidence of a subsequent repair to be used
to show control over the product in question, four years later, in Hoppe v.
75. Id




80. Id. As noted earlier, rule 407 specifically provides that the prohibition against ad-
mission of subsequent remedial measures does not require exclusion when the evidence is
offered to prove control and control is controverted. See supra notes 6, 26-29 and accompa-
nying text.
81. Wallner, 419 F.2d at 1032.
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Midwest Conveyor Co. ,82 the Eighth Circuit permitted a subsequent repair
to be introduced for the purpose of demonstrating thefeasibility of alterna-
tive design.83 In Hoppe, the conveyor arms of a hoist system crushed the
foot of an automobile plant employee when the employee turned a valve
located directly above the conveyor arms.8" The suit against Midwest Con-
veyor Co. was based on the theories of strict liability and breach of war-
ranty, alleging that the conveyor-hoist system was defectively designed.8"
Prior to the purchase of the hoist by General Motors, Midwest Conveyor
Co. had submitted a diagram of the conveyor system showing the manual
control valve in a location away from the machine's moving parts.86 Dur-
ing installation, however, the valve was placed directly above the conveyor
arms. After the accident, the valve was moved to conform to the original
diagram.87
The Eighth Circuit held that the preinstallation plan was admissible
under strict liability and warranty theory to demonstrate the feasibility of
an alternative design.88 The appeals court disagreed with the trial court's
contentions that the preinstallation plans were irrelevant and that the only
real issue was the condition of the machine at the time of installation.89
Elaborating, the Hoppe court noted that many factors that might not be
relevant to prove negligence are relevant to prove defective design, includ-
ing the design of products manufactured by competitors, "alternate designs
and post-accident modification of the machine," the safety record of the
machine and the cost and feasibity of alternate designs.9 °
In support of the proposition that postaccident modifications are rele-
vant in a defective design case, the Hoppe court quoted a decision holding
that evidence of postoccurrence changes is "relevant and material in deter-
82. 485 F.2d at 1196. See also FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note (discussing
exceptions to the rule, including feasibility).
83. Hoppe, 485 F.2d at 1201-02. While Hoppe was decided before the Federal Rules of
Evidence became effective, the case demonstrates the common law basis for rule 407's feasi-
bility exception.
84. Id at 1198-99.
85. Id at 1202.
86. Id at 1199.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1201-02. Although the preinstallation plans actually demonstrated the preac-
cident, preinstallation design, they also were an accurate representation of the position to
which the control valve was moved after the accident. The plans could thus be viewed as a
representation of the subsequent remedial measure.
89. The trial court also excluded proof as to whether the valve could have been feasibly
and economically located elsewhere, and testimony as to the location of the valve as set forth
in the plans and specifications. Id.
90. ld. at 1202.
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mining that a design alternative is feasible."' Thus, the holding in Hoppe
was limited to the proposition that postaccident changes are admissible to
provefeasibility in a defective design case.92
In accordance with the approach taken by the Wallner court, the Eighth
Circuit in Hoppe concluded that a subsequent remedial measure is rele-
vant to some issues in a strict liability case.9 3 The third major opinion in
this precode line of cases also considered the issue of relevance, but only
after it addressed the public policy goal of encouraging subsequent reme-
dial actions.94 In Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co. ,95 the Seventh Circuit held that a
subsequent repair was admissible against a party who did not make the
postaccident change.96 The case involved a strict liability action based on
defective design.97 In Lolie, a coal miner was killed when a steel rail
struck a power cable and a series of metal clips holding the cable to the
roof of the mine gave way.98 The decedent's wife alleged that the metal
clips manufactured by the defendant were defectively designed and unrea-
sonably dangerous.99 The jury, however, found that the mine operator's
negligence in unloading the steel rail was the sole cause of the accident.
Despite the plaintiff's proffer, the jury did not hear evidence that, after the
accident, the state mine inspector directed the mine operator to strengthen
the clip device system by tying the cable in place with rope every sixty feet.
Although the Seventh Circuit stated that the trial court should have ad-
91. Id at 1202 n.3 (emphasis added) (quoting Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp.,
281 N.E.2d 749, 753 (III. App. 1972)):
If the feasibility of alternative designs may be shown by the opinions of experts
or by the existence of safety devices on other products or in the design thereof we
conclude that evidence of a post occurrence change is equally relevant and mate-
rial in determining that a design alternative is feasible.
Id. The same footnote also cites to Wallner, 419 F.2d 1028, for support.
92. The court did not address whether a postaccident modification may be used to
prove the existence of a defect.
93. Hoppe, 485 F.2d at 1201-02.
94. Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
95. Id.
96. Id The court stated that the social policy of encouraging people to make repairs is
not applicable to a third party who did not make the repairs. Although the court did not
explain its rationale for this holding, it is conceivable that, in a case involving several de-
fendants, exclusion vis a vis the repairing party and admission vis a vis the nonrepairing
party might encourage each party to race the other in the quest to become the repairer. But
the rule could have the opposite effect where control over the instrument of harm is at issue.
In that situation, each party might be encouraged not to make the repair for fear that evi-
dence of subsequent repair could be used to show his control. See supra text accompanying
notes 76-80.
97. Lolie, 502 F.2d at 743.
98. Id. at 743.
99. Id. at 743-44.
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mitted the evidence, it held that exclusion was not reversible error. ,00 Ex-
plaining its decision, and referring to the then-proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, the court noted the two possible reasons for excluding remedial
evidence: (1) the social policy of encouraging increased safety, and (2) the
irrelevance of the evidence to the issue of negligence.'' The court held
that the public policy of encouraging repairs was inapplicable to a defend-
ant, such as the manufacturer in this case, who did not make the repairs.'02
Having disposed of the "primary"' 3 ground for exclusion, the Lolie
court addressed the relevance issue in the context of strict liability theory.
To impose strict liability upon a defendant under Illinois law, a plaintiff
must prove that the product did not meet the required standard of
safety."° This requires proving that the product, as designed, could not
have prevented the accident, that there was an alternative design that
could have prevented the accident and that the alternative design was fea-
sible.'O5 Relying on Hoppe, the court said that evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures would be relevant if it "tended to satisfy the plaintiffs
burden on any of these issues ... ."106 Then, without specifying which of
these three issues the subsequent repair would tend to prove, the court
concluded that the evidence was relevant.1
0 7
Read in the context of the cases relied upon by Lolie, 108 it appears that
the Seventh Circuit's decision was limited to the pronouncement that a
subsequent remedial measure is relevant to both the existence and the fea-
sibility of alternative designs.I°9 Naturally, since a subsequent design is an
alternative to the original product, it could perhaps be relevant to the issue
100. Id at 744.
101. Id at 744 n.I and accompanying text (citing FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee
note).
102. Id. at 744; see also supra note 96.
103. Lolie, 502 F.2d at 744. The Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Rules of Evi-
dence referred to the policy of encouraging repairs as the "more impressive" rationale. FED.
R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note. This suggests that evidence must be excluded where
admission would violate the paramount social policy. It does not, however, suggest that
evidence must be admitted where the only objection to it is that it violates the rule's other
ground for exclusion, namely, the low probative value of the evidence. Therefore, the Lolie
court found it necessary to consider the relevance of the evidence. Lolie, 502 F.2d at 744.
104. Id.
105. Id
106. Id (emphasis added) (citing Hoppe, 485 F.2d at 1202; Wallner, 419 F.2d at 1032;
Sutkowski, 5 11. App. 3d at 318-20, 281 N.E.2d at 752-53; Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75
Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205, 209-10 (1969)).
107. Lolie, 502 F.2d at 744.
108. See supra note 106.
109. Each of the cases cited by Hoppe held that the evidence was admissible to prove




of substitute products." ° It is questionable, however, that a subsequent
design could tend to prove that the original product was incapable of
preventing the accident. The fact that a subsequent design might prevent a
particular type of accident does not show that the earlier design caused the
accident or that it was incapable of preventing the accident.
Whereas Wainer, Hoppe and Lolie all involved strict liability actions
based on allegations of design defect, the fourth major case in this com-
mon-law line involved an allegedly defective product made unsafe because
it was accompanied by an inadequate warning. In Sterner v. U.S. Plywood-
Champion Paper, Inc., the plaintiff was burned when a can of all-pur-
pose cement he was using burst into flames," 2 In addition to claiming that
the defendant manufacturer was strictly liable because the allegedly inade-
quate warning of flammability" 3 made the product defective, the plaintiff
argued alternatively that the defendant was negligent in failing to provide
a reasonable warning.' The evidentiary questions revolved around three
warnings: one before the accident and two following the accident." 5
The majority opinion did not distinguish between the preaccident and
postaccident warnings, instead characterizing all the warnings as "subse-
quent alterations.""' ' The court did, however, hold them to be admissible
for different purposes. The preaccident warning was relevant to show the
110. This would relate to assertions that there was an alternative design that could have
prevented the injury, and that the alternative design was feasible. See supra note 105 and
accompanying text.
111. 519 F.2d 1352 (8th Cir. 1975).
112. Id at 1353.
113. Id The label on the can purchased by the plaintiff read: "DANGER, EX-
TREMELY FLAMMABLE MIXTURE. DO NOT USE NEAR FIRE OR FLAME....
Avoid using spark producing electrical equipment." Id. The can further warned the user to
extinguish all flames and pilot lights, use in a well-ventilated area, and keep the product
away from heat, sparks and flame until vapors are gone. In using the product, the plaintiff
claimed to have extinguished the pilot lights in the kitchen, but admitted that he did not
disconnect the refrigerator and that he used an electric fan for ventilation. Id.
114. Id As in this case, plaintiffs in products liability cases often plead negligence, strict
liability and breach of warranty alternatively.
115. Id Prior to the date of purchase, the defendant manufacturer revised the warning
on the cement to make it more emphatic. ld. at 1354. Later, after the accident, the warning
was changed on two more occasions, each time making its point more emphatically than
before. Id. See also id. at 1355 (Henley, J., concurring) (noting that the two later changes
were made after the accident). The language of the three postmanufacture warning changes
was not mentioned in the opinion. The court noted, however, that at trial the plaintiffs
expert testified that the product had a flash point equivalent to gasoline. Id. at 1353. Fur-
thermore, an employee of the defendant testified that in order to use the product safely in
the kitchen of the plaintiff's mobile home, all electric appliances, even a kitchen wall clock,
would have to be unplugged. Id.
116. 1d at 1354. The concurring opinion, however, suggests that only the two post-acci-
dent changes fell within the general rule, and that the postmanufacture, preaccident repair
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'plaintiffs preaccident knowledge."" ' 7 The postaccident changes were rel-
evant to the issue of the "feasibility of providing more explicit, detailed
and understandable warnings."" ' 8
Like its predecessors in this line of cases, Sterner appears to be merely a
precode common-law application of the doctrine embodied in rule 407.
Despite the apparent attempts of Farner and Robbins to find in these deci-
sions some federal authority for the proposition that a distinction may be
made between subsequent repairs based on the theory of the suit, whether
brought in negligence or strict liability, no such distinction was made in
Wallner, Hoppe, Lolie or Sterner. In admitting evidence of subsequent
remedial measures, each of these precode federal decisions relied on either
the purpose for which the evidence was offered, such as feasibility or con-
trol, or the fact that the defendant did not make the repairs. Additionally,
each of these cases suggests that the public policy principle of encouraging
subsequent remedial measures is equally applicable to products actions,
whether based on negligence or founded on strict liability theory.
IV. PRECURSORY OPINIONS: LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR
EXCLUSION IN STRICT LIABILITY CASES
A. The Fallacy of Ault
Given the dearth of federal authority for the proposition that rule 407 is
inapplicable to strict liability actions, it becomes apparent that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court's decision in Ault was the sole precept for the Eighth
Circuit's rulings in Farner and Robbins." 9 The Ault court's holding that
the public policy of encouraging subsequent repairs does not apply to strict
liability cases was initially challenged by the Second Circuit in Smyth v.
Upjohn Co. ,2o a short, but well-reasoned per curiam decision. Although
Smyth involved an action based on negligence, the Second Circuit's deci-
did not because it was not done in response to the accident. Id. at 1355 (Henley, J.,
concurring).
117. Id. (emphasis added). The reference to the plaintiffs preaccident knowledge is
somewhat confusing. The court did note, however, that a manufacturer's duty to warn de-
pends on his "superior knowledge" relative to "one less knowledgeable." d. at n. I (quoting
Lakatosh v, Diamond Alkali Co., 208 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Iowa 1973)). Thus, it appears that
the court is talking about the plaintiffs knowledge of the product's propensities to harm
relative to the manufacturer's preaccident knowledge. See id at n. I and accompanying text.
118. Id at 1354. The concurring opinion said that there was no issue as to the feasibility
of designing a more explicit warning. Id at 1355 (Henley, J., concurring). It further stated
that there was no issue of prior knowledge. Id. While thus finding that the two postaccident
warnings did not fall within any exceptions to the rule against admission of subsequent
repairs, the concurring opinion concluded that there was no prejudicial error. Id.
119. See Farner, 562 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1977); Robbins, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977).
120. 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
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sion is significant because it points out that Ault's policy rationale-if ac-
cepted--could apply to all products liability actions, regardless of whether
the suit is in negligence, strict liability or warranty theory.' 2 ' Smyth sug-
gests that the distinction, if any, is not the theory of the suit, but whether
the product involved was mass produced. Additionally, the Smyth case
suggests that the public policy considerations must be coupled with an ex-
amination of the probative value of the evidence before a decision can be
made on admissibility. 1
22
In Smyth, the plaintiff took an antibiotic drug that he alleged was the
cause of his subsequently diagnosed colitis.' 23 Although the drug label
warned that the medication could cause "persistent diarrhea" and "en-
tercolitis," warnings published after Dr. Smyth ingested the drug were
more emphatic and eventually recommended treatment for side effects. '
24
Smyth sued for negligent failure to warn and sought to introduce evidence
of the subsequent warnings.1
25
On appeal, the Second Circuit first directed its attention to the policy
behind exclusion of subsequent remedial measures: that admission of the
evidence might discourage remedial action in a potentially dangerous situ-
ation.' 26 Citing Ault, the Second Circuit noted that the plaintiff's argu-
ment in favor of admission of a subsequent remedial measure was that
exclusion to encourage steps in furtherance of added safety is unnecessary
where the product at issue was mass produced. 127 Because there could be
additional law suits involving the product, the argument suggests, the mass
producer needs no additional incentive to make his product safer. '
28
While the Ault court had accepted that argument, the Smyth court did
12 1. See id. at 804-05.
122. 1d. at 805; see also Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 887-88 (holding that rule 407 applies
to strict liability on the dual grounds of relevance and policy).
123. Smyth, 529 F.2d at 803. The plaintiff, a doctor, treated himself with the antibiotic
Lincocin. He developed diarrhea two days after beginning treatment, and although he
stopped treatment of the drug after four days, the side-effects continued for six weeks, result-
ing in hospitalization. Id.
124. Id at 803-04 nn.l-2 and accompanying text.
125. Id at 803-04. In a case involving drug warnings, a plaintiff may usually plead alter-
natively, suing in negligence for negligent failure to give an adequate warning, or in strict
liability for failure to warn of an unavoidably dangerous product. See generally Werner, 628
F.2d 848 (where the plaintiff sued under both negligence and strict liability in a drug warn-
ing case).
126. Smyth, 529 F.2d at 804. See also FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
127. Smyth, 529 F.2d at 804 (citingAult, 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr.
812 (1974)): Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J.
837).
128. Smyth, 529 F.2d at 804. The plaintiff said the mass producer would make the repair
in any event, with or without the rule prohibiting admission.
19831
Catholic University Law Review
not find such reasoning to be compelling. The rule against admission of
subsequent remedial measures, the Smyth court asserted, might be more
forcefully supported by the public policy justification of encouraging re-
pairs in a case where the product in question was not mass produced.'
29
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the public policy rationale "still has
some weight" in cases involving mass-produced products.'3 Rejecting the
Ault rationale, the Smyth court emphasized that some manufacturers
might weigh the risk of additional suits against the risk of initial liability
and conclude that their potential liability was lower by maintaining the
status quo.' 31
But the Smyth court did not rest its decision solely on public policy con-
siderations. Noting that relevance was the second reason for excluding
evidence of subsequent remedial measures, the court discussed the limited
probative value of the evidence. 3 2 The court listed four firmly established
129. Id. at 805. The Smyth court emphasized, however, that "this has by no means been
established" by the plaintiff. Id.
130. Id
131. Id Obviously, if the evidence were admitted in the first case sued upon, it would
help establish initial liability. Furthermore, if the subsequent repair is the only evidence
from which a jury could infer defect, then by refraining from taking subsequent remedial
actions, the defendant could avoid both initial liability and future liability. This point is
made succinctly in Werner, 628 F.2d at 857, where the Fourth Circuit noted that the Ault
court's conclusion that a mass-producer risks increased liability by not repairing "assumes
that the product is defective, and overlooks the situation where the product is not defective
but could be made better." Id.
132. Smyth, 529 F.2d at 805. Several cases that have held rule 407 applicable to strict
liability cases appear to have been decided solely on the grounds of relevance. One recent
decision holding rule 407 applicable to strict liability cases was Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677
F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1982). The Josephs court specifically noted that it was considering
"the relevance of these remedial measures in light of Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence." Id. at 990. The plaintiffs attorney had argued that the policy of encouraging re-
pairs did not apply to subsequent remedial measures taken in strict liability cases.
Telephone interview with Arthur D. Rabelow, Artzt & Rabelow Associates, Bensalem, Pa.
(Oct. 6, 1982). But the court did not address the policy issues. Josephs, 677 F.2d at 990-91.
Holding that subsequent remedial measures may only be admitted where ownership, control
or feasibility are controverted, and finding that those issues were not controverted, the Third
Circuit refused to overturn the trial court's decision to exclude the evidence. Id. at 991.
In reaching that conclusion, the Third Circuit relied on an earlier Third Circuit case,
Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, 91-92 (3d Cir. 1979), and Bauman v. Volkswagen-
werk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232-33 (6th Cir. 1980) (subsequent remedial measure
may not be used to demonstrate defect). In Knight, the plaintiff had sued Otis Elevator Co.
for negligence, strict liability and breach of warranty. Knight, 596 F.2d at 86. Addressing
the subsequent remedial measure in one short paragraph, the Knight court made no mention
of the public policy grounds for exclusion under rule 407. Id at 91-92. Rather, the court
concluded that feasibility must be controverted under the rule. Because the jury had already
heard evidence that it would have been easy, simple and inexpensive to modify the elevator
in question by placing safety guards around the elevator buttons, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that evidence that these repairs had actually been made "would have been cumula-
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reasons for finding the evidence inadmissible to prove negligence: (1) tak-
ing precautions against the future is not an admission of responsibility for
the past; (2) subsequent actions have "no legitimate tendency to prove"
prior negligence; (3) such evidence is "calculated to distract" the jury from
the real issue; and (4) the evidence is aimed at prejudicing the jury against
the defendant. 133 Furthermore, the court noted that the plaintiffs in Smyth
did not need to demonstrate the feasibility of an alternative warning, as
that issue was not controverted. 134 Nor was the evidence needed to show
Upjohn's prior knowledge of the drug's dangers, as there was sufficient
independent evidence on that issue. 3 ' Therefore, the court said, the evi-
dence would be irrelevant to feasibility, cumulative as to prior knowledge,
and its only effect would be to create prejudice.
36
tive at best and prejudicial at worst." 1d at 91. The court then went on to hold that the trial
court had not abused its discretion by balancing the probative value of the evidence against
the cumulative and prejudicial nature of the evidence under rule 403. Id. at 92. It is clear
that the Knight court found that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is of low proba-
tive value, compared against its negative impact. Id. at 92 n. 10. Similarly, it is clear that the
opinion stands for the proposition that rule 407 applies to strict liability cases, for the court
made no exception in its ruling. d. at 91-92. See also Josephs, 677 F.2d at 891 (citing Knight
for the proposition that the First Circuit had already decided that rule 407 applies to strict
liability actions). It is not completely clear, however, whether the Knight court's conclusion
relied in any measure on the public policy of encouraging repairs. The decision did not
mention the public policy. Knight, 596 F.2d at 91-92. Therefore, it appears either that the
court believed that the applicability of the public policy grounds was so obvious that it need
not be mentioned, or the court was relying solely on the low probative value of the evidence.
Given that, at the time Knight was decided, at least one other circuit had already held that
the public policy principles underlying rule 407 did not apply to strict liability cases, it ap-
pears that the Knight court may have been deciding solely on the second rationale for exclu-
sion under rule 407, namely, low probative value of the evidence. Cf Robbins, 552 F.2d at
703 (Knight was decided two years after Robbins, and by the time Knight was decided in
1979 Robbins had been widely cited in both federal and state decisions on the issue). The
First Circuit's decision in Josephs, explicitly stating that its holding in that case was based on
"the relevance of these remedial measures," lends further support to the proposition that the
First Circuit's earlier holding in Knight was based solely on the low probative value of sub-
sequent remedial measures. See Josephs, 677 F.2d at 890-91.
133. Smyth, 529 F.2d at 805 (quoting Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. Co. v. Hawthorne,
144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892)). These four grounds for exclusion, all of which go to the question
of low probative value balanced against negative impact, were first enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. Co..
134. Smyth, 529 F.2d at 805. Tbus the evidence did not fall within the feasibility excep-
tion to the rule against admission. See FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note.
135. Smyth, 529 F.2d at 805.
136. Id. Low probative value, cumulativeness and the creation of prejudice are consider-
ations addressed in rule 403. FED. R. EvID. 403. The advisory committee note on rule 407
specifically requires a court to consider the factors included under rule 403 when a subse-
quent remedial measure is not automatically excluded. FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory commit-
tee note. For text of rule 403, see supra note 65. For discussion of rule 407's advisory
committee note's reference to rule 403, see supra text accompanying notes 30-32. See also
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The significance of Smyth is that it coupled the considerations of policy
and relevance to reach its conclusion. Weighing the risk of deterring re-
medial actions against the social goal of encouraging added safety, the
court determined that policy considerations required exclusion.' 37 Then,
balancing the limited probative value of the evidence against the danger of
prejudice, the Smyth court found the relevance scales weighed heavily to-
ward exclusion. By employing both balancing tests, Smyth addressed
whether the value of the evidence and the attendant risk of prejudice offset
the public policy considerations.
B. Automatic Exclusion
1. Absence of Probative Value as the Basis for Exclusion
Although exclusion of subsequent remedial measures under rule 407
rests ultimately, as the advisory committee noted, on the dual considera-
tions of public policy and probative value, 138 it is not always necessary to
address both issues. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit found in Luda Foster v. Ford Motor Co. ,139 an examination of the
Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1980). In that case, Ford Motor Co.
proffered evidence that the designer of a haylift attachment made postaccident modifications
to the attachment after the plaintiff had been injured when a bale of hay slid off the hayfork
attached to the Ford tractor's front-end loader. Id at 1306, 1309 n.I i. At trial, the trial court
refused to allow evidence of the postaccident modification, and dismissed Fort Motor Co.'s
third-party strict liability claim for contribution against the designer of the hayfork attach-
ment. Remanding the cause for retrial, the Fifth Circuit instructed the trial court to consider
the subsequent remedial measure in light of rules 407 and 403. Id at 1309 n. I. While
observing that there is a conflict among the circuits over whether rule 407 applies to strict
liability actions, the Fifth Circuit said that even if the trial court concluded rule 407 does not
apply to strict liability, admission of the evidence "must be considered in light of Rule 403."
Id
137. Smyth, 529 F.2d at 805.
138. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
139. 621 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1980). In Foster, a truck driver's widow sued Ford Motor Co.
for the wrongful death of her husband. Id at 717. The plaintiff contended and Ford stipu-
lated that a dowel pin attached to the suspension system separated from the vehicle's spacer
block and fell into the axle pad. Id The issue was whether that fact rendered the truck
defective. At trial, the plaintiff alleged that the loosening of the one-inch dowel pin caused a
shift in the left front suspension assembly, including the spacer block, spring leafs and U-
bolts. Id at 718. According to the plaintiffs theory of the accident, the slippage of these
components resulted in the driver's loss of control over the vehicle. Ford maintained, how-
ever, that the dowel pin was simply a remnant of the manufacturing process, and that it
played no role in the stability of the suspension system. Id at 717-18. Thus, Ford con-
tended, the loosening of the dowel pin did not render the truck defective, nor cause a loss of
control over the vehicle. Id On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the trial court had erred in
refusing to admit evidence that after manufacture of the truck and before the accident Ford
Motor Co. had changed the design of the assembly, casting it as a single unit. Id at 720.
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probative value may occasionally dispose of the need to address the over-
riding public policy concerns.
Foster involved a design change in the suspension assembly of a 1975
model truck manufactured by Ford. 4' The truck driven by plaintiffs de-
cedent was manufactured with a two-part suspension system, whereas later
models were fitted with a single-unit suspension system.' 4 ' The plaintiff
contended that the defective design of her husband's truck had caused him
to lose control of the vehicle.
Although the plaintiff challenged exclusion of the postmanufacture,
preaccident design change on the grounds that rule 407 does not apply to
strict liability cases, the Fifth Circuit stated that it need not decide that
issue. 142 Noting the split among the circuits, the Foster court refused to
consider whether the public policy goal of encouraging subsequent reme-
dial measures requires exclusion in strict products liability cases.
143
Rather, the court addressed the evidentiary questions on the basis of rule
401 and rule 403.
In analyzing the relevance of the design change, the Foster court found
the change to be without probative value since Ford had already conceded
at trial that the use of a single-unit system was "technologically feasible
and economically practical."' Turning its attention to rule 403, the court
140. 1d at 717-18.
141. Id. at 720. The design change was made before the accident took place. 1d
142. Id at 720-21.
143. Id Several months after the Foster case, the Fifth Circuit decided in Arceneaux v.
Texaco, Inc., 623 F.2d 924 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 928 (1981), that rule 407's
reference to actions taken "after the event" refers to actions taken after the accident, and
does not refer to actions taken after manufacture but before the accident. Id at 928. But the
court held that the evidence of post-manufacture design change was irrelevant to the issue of
faulty design under rules 401 and 402 and should therefore be excluded. Id In a suit for
negligent design, the court noted, the post-manufacture design change is not probative of
"whether a product was designed with reasonable care for safety in the use for which it was
manufactured, measured by the knowledge available both at the time of design and manufac-
ture." Id. (emphasis added).
144. Foster, 621 F.2d at 721. Refusing to consider whether the evidence might have been
relevant to some other issue not raised during the offer of proof, the Foster court said it
could address only the precise purpose for which the evidence was actually offered. Id.
(citing FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(2)). Rule 103(a)(2) states:
Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence
unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(2) In the case ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of the evidence
was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within
which questions were asked.
FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(2). At trial, the evidence was only offered to prove feasibility. Decid-
ing the relevance of the evidence on the issue of feasibility, the court cited rule 401. Rule
401 states: "'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
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held that the evidence "[a]t best . . . would have been cumulative" be-
cause Ford's concession was sufficient to find for the plaintiff on the issue
of feasibility,'45 and because the jury was given extensive evidence from
both sides as to how a redesigned system would have worked.'46 Of
greater concern to the court was that the introduction of a model of the
redesigned system could have been unfairly prejudicial to the defendant or
misleading and confusing to the jury.'47
The approach taken by the Foster court, relying solely on rules 401 and
403, suggests that the public policy concern of encouraging repairs should
not be addressed until it has been determined that the probative value of
the evidence outweighs any of the concerns embodied in rule 403. Thus
Foster suggests that exclusion under rule 407 may be based entirely on the
low probative value of the evidence,'a4 without ever addressing the "other,
and more impressive, ground for exclusion,"' 149 namely, public policy.
2. Failure to Controvert as the Basis for Exclusion
By providing for automatic exclusion, the drafters of rule 407 appear to
have made a judgment that subsequent remedial measures are of low pro-
bative value when the issue on which the evidence is offered has not been
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. The advisory commit-
tee note to that rule states:
An enormous number of cases fall in no set pattern, and this rule is designed as a
guide for handling them. On the other hand, some situations recur with sufficient
frequency to create patterns susceptible of treatment by specific rules. Rule 404 and
those following it are of that variety; they also serve as illustrations of the applica-
tion of the present rule as limited by the exclusionary principles of Rule 403.
FED. R. EvID. 401 advisory committee note (emphasis added). The implication, therefore, is
that rule 404 and those following it, including rule 407, are rules of relevance, and that the
same result accomplished by a rule such as rule 407 should also be accomplished if a court
applied only rules 401 and 403. Id.
145. Foster, 621 F.2d at 721 (citing FED. R. EVID. 403). For text of rule 403, see supra
note 65.
146. Foster, 621 F.2d at 721.
147. Id. But cumulativeness and unfair prejudice may, in some cases, be interrelated.
"'Unfair prejudice' within [the context of rule 403] means an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." FED.
R. EVID. 403 advisory committee note. "In reaching a decision whether to exclude on
grounds of unfair prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or
lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction. . . . The availability of other means of proof
may also be an appropriatefactor." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, where the evidence is both
cumulative and unfairly prejudicial, the advisory committee note suggests that exclusion is
the proper course. Id
148. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note. See also infra notes 25-32 and
accompanying text. Accord Josephs, 677 F.2d at 990-91; Knight, 596 F.2d at 91-92.
149. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note.
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expressly controverted. 5 ° In Oberst v. International Harvester Co. ,"'5 the
Seventh Circuit expressly held that rule 407 applies to strict liability ac-
tions,' 52 but refused to admit evidence of a design change because the fea-
sibility of using an alternative design was not controverted.'
53
In Oberst, the challenged design "defect" was a dual-strap bunk re-
150. Id Exclusion is automatic when feasibility, ownership or control are not contro-
verted. Id.
151. 640 F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980).
152. Id. at 866. But see id at 867 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
The dissent concluded that rule 407 should not apply to strict liability, and is one of the most
detailed opinions written by a federal circuit judge taking that position. Judge Swygert
states :
In strict liability cases, an exclusionary rule is unlikely to achieve its ostensible
objective, primarily because the exceptions to the rule make exclusion uncertain, if
not unlikely. Ultimately, admissibility depends upon the effectiveness of the plain-
tiff's trial tactics in getting the defendant to "controvert" feasibility or opening it-
self to impeachment. Many defendants may be unaware of the rule. It is illogical
to assume that such defendants will alter their behavior because of it. Of the de-
fendants who are aware of the rule, most will be insured. Their insurers are likely
to encourage or require them to mitigate losses by taking remedial measures, re-
gardless of the existence of an exclusionary rule. Some remedial measures may be
required by regulatory authorities. Potential defendants are not likely to violate
regulatory mandates because of the lack of an exclusionary rule. . . . With respect
to the federal rule, in particular, because most products liability cases are litigated
in state court, the only basis for federal jurisdiction being diversity, the coercive
effect of an exclusionary rule is negligible.
Id. at 870 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The same arguments, of
course, would apply equally to suits brought under negligence theory. Furthermore, when a
third party forces a manufacturer to take a remedial measure, the probative value of the
evidence as an admission is even lower than when the manufacturer acts voluntarily. Cf
FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note (explaining the limited relevance of remedial
conduct, the note says: "The conduct is not in fact an admission, since the conduct is
equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence."). Judge
Swygert concluded that because rule 407 may not serve effectively to exclude evidence of
subsequent remedial measures, rule 403 should be used instead. Oberst, 640 F.2d at 870 n.8
(Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The drafters of rule 407, however,
suggested that rule 407 should work with rule 403 to exclude remedial evidence. FED. R.
EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
153. Oberst, 640 F.2d at 866. But see id. at 868 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Swygert said a defendant must make an unequivocal concession
on feasibility in order to make that issue uncontroverted under rule 407. Contra FED. R.
EviD. 407 advisory committee note (allowing a defendant to gain automatic exclusion by
admitting feasibility, but not suggesting that failure to make an admission makes an issue
uncontroverted). In this case, Judge Swygert suggested, the defendant's expert controverted
the feasibility of employing an alternative design by arguing that the alternative design was
unnecessary and that the design used at the time of the accident may have been more effec-
tive in certain types of accidents. Oberst, 640 F.2d at 868 (Swygert, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). But see Werner, 628 F.2d at 855 (distinguishing between contesting
the feasibility of using an alternative warning and contesting the necessity of using an alter-
native warning).
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straint system employed in the sleeping compartment of a truck.'54 Inter-
national Harvester switched to a woven-mesh system after the accident.'
55
Arguing that the subsequent remedial measure was admissible for any
purpose and was not restricted to impeachment or to rebutting a denial of
feasibility, ownership or control, the plaintiff contended that rule 407's ex-
ception clause is applicable only where the central issue of the case is neg-
ligence or culpable conduct. 1
5 6
In rejecting that reading, the Seventh Circuit implied that subsequent
remedial measures generally have little probative value, regardless of
whether the central issue is negligence or strict liability. 5 7 The court
reached this conclusion despite rule 407's nonexclusive list of permissible
uses of remedial measures.' 58 The failure to consider other possible uses,
however, may have been due to the plaintiffs apparent failure to suggest a
purpose for which the evidence might have been more probative.
C Are Remedial Measures Probative of the Existence of a Defect?
In Longenecker v. General Motors Corp. ,151 the Ninth Circuit specifically
decided that a recall letter advising Chevrolet Impala owners that their
cars should be retrofitted with a restraint to limit "engine lift" 6 ° was rele-
vant to demonstrate the existence of a defect in the car's engine mounts.' 6 '
154. Oberst, 640 F.2d at 864. The plaintiff also alleged that the truck cab's interior was
defective, but no subsequent remedial measures were taken with respect to that portion of
the truck. Id.
155. Id. at 867.
156. Id at 866. The plaintiff contended that the first sentence of rule 407 applies only to
negligence and culpable conduct, and that the second sentence is expressly an exception to
the first in cases involving negligence or culpable conduct. But see text of FED. R. EvID. 407
(references to negligence, culpable conduct, ownership, control and feasibility appear to be
mentioned as elements of a case, and there is no express limitation as to applicability of the
rule based on the theory of the case).
157. See Oberst, 640 F.2d at 866 (the decision does not even mention the social policy of
encouraging parties to make repairs); see also id at 867 n.2 (Swygert, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that rule 407 is based primarily upon the social policy of
encouraging repairs, and not upon relevancy).
158. See FED. R. EvID. 407 (subsequent remedial measures may be admitted in some
cases "when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control or feasibility
... (emphasis added)). See also Werner, 628 F.2d at 856 (exceptions listed in the rule
are intended to be illustrative and not exhaustive).
159. 594 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979).
160. Id. at 1286.
161. Id. Although the recall letter stated that engine lift would occur only upon rapid
acceleration, if at all, and although the driver of the Impala testified that he had not acceler-
ated when he lost control, the court held that the recall letter was relevant to the proposition
that "there was a flaw" in the engine mounts. Id. General Motors argued that the evidence
was of little probative value on the issue of defect because the circumstances under which
engine separation could occur were not present. Id.
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The plaintiff had contended that the alleged defect had caused the 1966
Impala to become uncontrollable.
162
Upholding the admissibility of the recall letter on the defect issue, the
Ninth Circuit emphasized that it was not deciding the question under rule
407."3 Because General Motors' only objection was that the probative
value did not outweigh the prejudicial effect,"6 the Longenecker ruling
was limited to rule 403's considerations. The court did not decide whether
a recall letter is a subsequent remedial measure, or whether rule 407 ap-
plies to strict liability cases.' 65 Nor did the court reach the ultimate ques-
tion of whether the social policy goal of encouraging repairs in a
potentially dangerous situation outweighs the possible probative value of
the evidence.' 6 6 Clearly, a recall letter may be more probative of the exist-
ence of a defect than would less drastic remedial measures since recall
implies an exigent need to remedy an existing condition. 167 Still, it is pre-
cisely because the need for remedial measures may be greater in such
cases, that the public policy against inhibiting measures in furtherance of
added safety through exclusion may be most compelling. Therefore, fail-
ure to invoke rule 407 when the evidence could be highly probative of
defect may be a fatal flaw.
Indeed, in Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft 68 the Sixth
Circuit found that admission of a subsequent remedial measure to prove
defect was a "basic error" under rule 407, requiring reversal and re-
mand.'69 The rationale used in Bauman implicitly demonstrated the Sixth
162. Id. at 1285. In Longenecker, the plaintiff was injured when a 1966 Chevrolet Im-
pala went out of control, traveled 145 feet across a median strip, hit a concrete abutment,
flipped into the air and landed on the roof of the plaintiff's Volkswagen. Id Contending
that the driver of the Impala lost control because of a defect in the car's engine mount, the
driver of the Volkswagen sued General Motors Corp. in strict liability for defective design
and manufacture. Id.
163. Id at 1286. At trial the defendant did not object under rule 407. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id It is clear, however, that a recall is the first step in furtherance of added safety
where a product is already on the market.
166. Id In negligence cases, rule 407 appears to be a determination that no matter how
much probative value the evidence of repair has on the issue of negligence, the social policy
of encouraging repairs should control. Thus, it is never necessary to weigh the probative
value of the evidence as proof of negligence against the negative impact of the evidence.
Exclusion in the issue of negligence is automatic. FED. R. EvID. 407.
167. It is questionable that a manufacturer would go to the time, expense and trouble of
recalling his product where the need was minor. It might be reasonable to assume, however,
that a manufacturer would change the product in the future, without remedying products
already sold, where the need for change was slight.
168. 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980).
169. Id at 232-33. Accord Estate of Spinosa v. International Harvester Co., 621 F.2d
1154, 1160 n.5 (Ist Cir. 1980). In International Harvester, the driver of a 1966 pickup truck
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Circuit's view that rule 407 applies to strict liability cases. 7' Additionally,
the Bauman court equated the use of a subsequent measure to demonstrate
defect with employment of the evidence to establish negligence. 171
In Bauman, the plaintiffs brought suit under the theories of negligence,
and her daughter were killed and a son injured when the truck manufactured by the defend-
ant went out of control and crashed into a bridge abutment, Id at 1156. Contending that a
pinhole developed in the brake tubing, causing a sudden failure of the brake system, the
decedents' estates argued that the truck was defective because it did not have a dual brake
system. Id at 1160-61. After manufacture of the truck, but before the accident, Interna-
tional Harvester changed to a dual brake design. Id. at 1161. The First Circuit held that
"post-manufacture evidence can not be used to prove the defective design of the product at
the time it was manufactured." Id at 1160 n.5 (citing R. HURSH & H. BAILEY, AMERICAN
LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 9:19, at 308 (2d ed. 1974)). But the court noted that because
International Harvester contended that design modification was not feasible, the evidence
was admissible to rebut that contention. 621 F.2d at 1160 n.5.
170. 621 F.2d at 232-33. It is somewhat unclear whether Bauman actually held that rule
407 is applicable to strict liability cases. Compare S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note
1, at 180-81 (noting that although the Bauman suit was brought under both negligence and
strict liability, the Sixth Circuit "did not specifically address the question whether Rule 407
applies when evidence is offered in a products liability case only to prove a defect") with
Josephs, 677 F.2d at 991 (citing Bauman for the proposition that rule 407 applies to products
liability cases based on strict liability theory). But see Hall v. American Steamship Co., 688
F.2d 1062, 1066-68 (6th Cir. 1982) (in which the Sixth Circuit definitively held that rule 407
applies to strict liability cases). Even if the Sixth Circuit had not clarified its position with its
ruling in Hall, the Bauman court clearly failed to adopt a strict liability exception to rule
407, Additionally, the Bauman court's express equation of negligence with defect appears to
support this point, for defect is the essential element in a strict products liability case. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1974):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
171. Bauman, 621 F.2d at 232-33. The court stated, "[t]he plaintiffs simply claimed that
the design was changed to remedy a defect-a reason the Rule expressly forbids the jury to
consider." Id at 233. In the next breath, the court stated, "[w]e believe the jury considered
the evidence as showing negligence and we must therefore order a new trial." Id. Previ-
ously, the court had noted, the subsequent remedial measure was almost the only evidence
"from which the jury could infer a design defect .... ." d. at 232. Therefore, the court
said, a correct ruling on the admissibility of the evidence was "crucial" since without the
evidence being used to show defect, that issue might not have been established. Id. at 232.
In fact, the court said that the only other evidence presented on the issue of defect was, by
itself, "barely sufficient" to send the issue to the jury. Id. at 233.
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strict liability, and breach of warranty, arguing that the door latch on their
Karmann Ghia was defectively designed and that repeated blows to the
door handle caused a premature opening of the door during a "'moderate'
sideswipe collision." 7 2 Noting that the public policy rationale behind rule
407 is to encourage improved product safety without forcing producers to
risk an increase in past liability, the Sixth Circuit held the use of a subse-
quent remedial measure to prove defective design was impermissible
under the rule.
173
Although the plaintiffs purportedly introduced the subsequent design
change in the door latch to prove feasibility, the Bauman court emphasized
that issue was not controverted. 174 Indeed, the evidence was actually used
for the forbidden purpose of proving defect, the court said.' 75 Moreover,
the Sixth Circuit stated, the error was compounded by the trial judge's
refusal to instruct the jury not to consider the evidence as proof of defect
or negligence.' 76 Additionally, the subsequent remedial measure was the
only evidence from which the jury could have inferred defect,' 77 save for
some tests that were "barely sufficient" to send the defect issue to the
jury. ' 78 As a result, the court intimated, Volkswagen was forced to increase
172. Id. at 231-32. The plaintiffs inBauman were driving a Karmann Ghia Volkswagen
when they collided with a 1968 Plymouth. Id at 231. After side-swiping the Plymouth
repeatedly, the Karmann Ghia pulled ahead and crashed into a large fencepost. Id. The
central issue at trial was whether the Karmann Ghia's passenger door opened prematurely
during the "'moderate' sideswipe collision." Id at 232. The plaintiffs contended that the
door latch was defectively designed and that repeated side-swipe blows to the door handle
caused the latch to open prematurely. Id. Volkswagen, however, contended that the door
opened when the fencepost struck the car door, bending the actuating rod inside the door.
Id
173. Id. at 233. "[Tlhat the design was changed to remedy a defect [is] a reason the Rule
expressly forbids the jury to consider," the court said. Id.
174. Id. The court distinguished controversion of the feasibility of making a design
change from controversion of the reasons for making a design change. Id Volkswagen had
contended that it changed the design to comply with new government regulations, while the
plaintiffs contended the change was made to remedy a defect. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The trial court instructed the jury to consider the evidence of design change
"solely as to whether or not ... there was a feasible alternative in design." Id (quoting Tr.
Vol. III, at 83). The Sixth Circuit said this was not sufficient. Id. In a close case, the court
said, the jury instruction should specifically prohibit the jury from considering the evidence
on forbidden issues. The failure to so instruct the jury, the Sixth Circuit said, would be
unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. Id.
177. 1d. at 232.
178. Id. at 232-33. The evidence which would have been "barely sufficient" to send the
issue of defect to the jury consisted of "hammer tests" to determine the sensitivity of the
door latch. Id. at 233. In the tests, an expert for the plaintiffs leaned his back against the
inside of the driver's door while his assistant hit the passenger door handle with a rubber
mallet. Id. On average, the door required two blows to open.
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liability for the past because it decided to improve its product, 179 a result
the drafters of rule 407 specifically intended to avoid. 8 '
Bauman's significance is that it emphasizes the interrelationship between
the public policy of encouraging repairs and the probative value of the
evidence. Where evidence of subsequent repair is the only substantial evi-
dence from which a jury could infer defect, public policy demands exclu-
sion; admission would force increased liability, discouraging future
repairs. That conclusion, while perhaps valid, is not fully supported in the
Bauman opinion. Certainly, the decision draws the clear parallel between
the use of a subsequent measure to prove negligence in a negligence suit
and the use of the evidence to prove defect in a strict liability suit. It fails,
however, to consider whether there are any reasons why the policy of en-
couraging repairs should not apply to strict liability cases.
That question was considered by 4ult, Robbins and Farner. But until
recently, Smyth was the only case that challenged the public policy conclu-
sions reached in those decisions, and it did so in the context of a negligence
case involving a mass-produced product. The cases that had considered
rule 407 in the strict liability context either concluded that subsequent re-
medial measures are of low probative value and that the risks of prejudice,
cumulativeness, or confusion outweighed the possible value, or they bal-
anced probative value against policy without first fully addressing the con-
tention that exclusion is not needed to encourage repairs in strict liability
cases. Thus, although these cases emphasize that the first basis for exclu-
sion-low probative value coupled with negative impact-may itself be
sufficient to prohibit use of the evidence, they left in their wake doubt as to
the validity of the policy of encouraging repairs in the strict liability
context.
V. THE TREND TOWARD APPLICATION OF RULE 407 IN STRICT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS
As doubt cries for certainty, splits among the federal circuits on impor-
tant issues lead to calls by the legal community for resolution. In the case
of rule 407 and its applicability to strict liability product actions, some
authors have suggested that the federal circuits are so hopelessly in conflict
that Supreme Court review of the issue is a necessity.'8 The Supreme
179. Id at 232. The court stated that the admissibility question became "crucial" be-
cause without the evidence of subsequent remedial measures the jury would have had to rely
solely on the "barely sufficient" tests conducted by the plaintiffs' expert. Id at 232-33. See
also supra note 178.
180. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
181. See, e.g., Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 and Its State Variations: The Courts
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Court has had the opportunity to decide the issue over the past few years,
but each time it has refused to grant certiorari.' 82 As at least one circuit
judge has noted, recognition of exceptions to rule 407 has clouded applica-
tion of the rule with uncertainty. 8 3 In addition, the conflict among the
circuits has left manufacturers in a quandary. 8 4 While subsequent reme-
dial measures may be inadmissible in one jurisdiction where their products
are sold, in another, such measures may be admissible to prove that their
earlier products were defective. The situation has led some legal observers
to call for the drafting of a new uniform rule. 85 But congressional action
or Supreme Court review may not be necessary to achieve uniformity. In
the current controversy over the applicability of rule 407 to strict products
liability actions, the effective reasoning of recent decisions from several
circuits may signal both the vitality of rule 407 and the demise of
uncertainty. 
86
A. Werner v. Upjohn
The first fully-reasoned challenge to the contention that rule 407 is inap-
plicable to strict liability cases arose in Werner v. Upjohn.i17 In Werner,
the Fourth Circuit held that the express exceptions to rule 407 must be
Perform Some "Subsequent Remedial Measures" of Their Own in Products Liability Cases, 49
UMKC L. Rev. 338, 351 (1981).
182. See, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
1080 (1981); Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
2036 (1982).
183. Oberst, 640 F.2d at 870 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
supra note 152.
184. The need for uniformity in the products liability area is one of the central focuses of
Note, The Casefor the Renovated Repair Rule. Admission of Evidence of Subsequent Repairs
Against the Mass Producer in Strict Products Liability, 29 AM. U.L. REV. 135 (1979). The
contention of the article is that manufacturers and consumers need a uniform evidentiary
rule on which they can rely in strict products liability cases. The rule suggested by the
author is admission of subsequent remedial measures for the purpose of proving defect. Id
at 179-80.
185. Id.
186. See Werner, 628 F.2d at 853-60; Cann, 658 F.2d at 59-60; Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at
885-89; Hall 688 F.2d at 1066-68; see also Josephs, 677 F.2d at 990-91; McGowne v. Chal-
lenge-Cook Bros., 672 F.2d 652, 665 (8th Cir. 1982) (citing Cann and noting that the state of
the law on the applicability of rule 407 to strict liability cases appears to be changing). In
McGowne, the Eighth Circuit specifically refrained from overturning a trial court decision to
exclude evidence of subsequent changes to a warning in a case involving strict liability.
Overturning the case on other grounds, the Eighth Circuit instructed the trial court to use its
discretion and to consider the appropriate law as it stands at the time of retrial. Id at 665.
But see Kobayashi, supra note 9, at 346-47 (while the author apparently approves of the
Werner court's reasoning, he concludes that the debate will continue, and that the Ault
rationale will ultimately prevail).
187. 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
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narrowly construed to effectuate the paramount public policy of encourag-
ing safety-improving measures.' 88 For the same reason, emphasized the
court, there should be a presumption against recognizing new
exceptions. 189
188. Id. at 855. In Werner, the Fourth Circuit addressed the use of a subsequent reme-
dial measure to demonstrate the feasibility of giving an alternative warning on the antibiotic
drug ingested by the plaintiff. Id The trial judge had admitted the post-accident warning
over Upjohn's objections. Id at 853. The Fourth Circuit noted that the later warning was
more emphatic, alerting readers of the possibility of fatality and advising that the drug
should only be used for serious infections where less toxic antibiotics might not be appropri-
ate. Id Confronted with admission of this evidence, Upjohn argued that its earlier warning
was adequate since it included all of the consequences which eventually befell the plaintiff.
Id at 852. In his final instructions to the jury, the trial judge said the subsequent warning
should be considered only as evidence of the feasibility of issuing a stronger preaccident
warning. Id at 853. Yet throughout the trial and during the closing argument, the plain-
till's counsel had used the evidence to show antecedent negligence, asking witnesses whether
Upjohn "should have" issued the 1975 warning in 1974, telling the jury Upjohn knew the
drug had caused fatalities but "didn't tell the doctors until much later," and arguing that it
was "a violation of duty" to wait until 1975 to make the changes in the warning. Id. at 854.
Despite the trial judge's instructions to the jury, the plaintiff was "permitted" to use the
evidence to prove Upjohn's prior negligence, the Fourth Circuit said. Id A plaintiff may
not "insulate reversal by pointing to a limiting instruction given at the close of his case"
when throughout the trial he used the evidence for "a forbidden purpose," the Werner court
declared. Id
The court noted that a limiting instruction is the "usual solution" in cases where the jury
could make either a permitted or a forbidden inference from the evidence. But, here the
plaintiff in error used the evidence to prove negligence despite the limiting instruction of the
trial judge. The trial court's limiting instruction did not cure the improper use of the evi-
dence. Id In addition, when the evidence was first presented to the jury, the judge only told
the jury that they could not use the evidence to infer negligence or culpable conduct. He
failed, however, to tell the jury how the evidence could be used until the very end of the trial,
after both sides had rested their cases. Id at 853. After considering the misuse of the evi-
dence, the Werner panel next turned to the permissible use of subsequent remedial measures
under rule 407's express exceptions. Id at 854.
Although rule 407 allows admission of subsequent remedial measure to rebut an assertion
that making the change before the accident occurred was not feasible, the Werner court said
feasibility was not an issue in this case. Id at 854-55. Werner's counsel argued that Upjohn
"controverted" the feasibility of giving an earlier warning by not conceding the issue. ld at
855. But the Fourth Circuit, drawing from the rule's language, held that "an affirmative
concession is not required" to make feasibility a nonissue. Id Further defining the rule's
requirement that fesibility be "controverted," the Werner court said that a challenge to the
"necessity" of a different warning is not equivalent to challenging the "feasibility" of the
alternative warning. Id The court noted, "Upjohn does not argue that it could not have
written a stronger warning, it argues that the 1974 warning was adequate given the knowl-
edge that it had at the time. This defense simply does not raise an issue of feasibility." Id
Specifically, Upjohn said that because the phrase "minor or trivial infections" lacked a pre-
cise definition, it was not necessary, and possibly harmful, to tell doctors not to use the drug
in such cases. Rather, Upjohn stated, physicians were adequately advised of the proper
occasions for use of the drug in the Food and Drug Administration-approved INDICATIONS.
Id
189. Id at 856-58.
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In Werner, the plaintiff sued Upjohn Co. under the theories of negli-
gence, breach of warranty and strict liability, claiming he developed colitis
as a result of an inadequate warning on Upjohn's penicillin-substitute
drug, Cleocin.' 9° The central issue in the case was the adequacy of a 1974
preinjury warning Upjohn had issued for the drug.' 9 ' On that issue, the
Fourth Circuit said, no evidence was more "important" than a postinjury
warning issued by the defendant in 1975."9
Although the trial judge had admitted the subsequent warning under
rule 407's feasibility exception,' 93 the Fourth Circuit stressed that even
when the evidence is offered for a concededly permissible purpose, admis-
sion must not be freely granted. 94 Reasoning that liberal admission of
subsequent remedial evidence would subvert the policy of encouraging re-
medial action, the court suggested that such evidence should only be ad-
mitted when the need for it is found to outweigh the attendant risk of
violating public policy.' 95 Quoting from McCormick on Evidence, the
court suggested three factors that should be considered in deciding need:
(1) that the issue on which the evidence is offered is of "substantial impor-
tance"; (2) that it is "actually, and not merely formally in dispute"; and (3)
that the issue is not capable of proof by inference from other convenient
evidence.' 96 Following from this obvious precept that the express excep-
tions should not be allowed to overwhelm the rule, the Fourth Circuit con-
190. Id at 851. Werner's complaint alleged that Upjohn had been negligent in either
marketing or selling the drug, and in failing to adequately warn of the drug's dangerous side
effects, that Upjohn had breached either an express or an implied warranty, and that Upjohn
was strictly liable for marketing an unreasonably dangerous drug. Id.; see also id at 858 n.4
and accompanying text (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k
(1977) and distinguishing between an unavoidably unsafe product and a product made un-
reasonably dangerous or defective by a failure to give a proper warning). Werner claimed
that after five days of taking the Upjohn drug, he developed nausea, severe diarrhea and
dehydration and that eventually a large portion of his colon had to be removed. Id at 852.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 853. The 1975 postinjury warning stated in part: "Clindamycin can cause
severe colitis which may end fatally. Therefore, it should be reserved for serious infections
where less toxic antimicrobial agents are inappropriate .... " Id In contrast the 1974
warning stated in part: "Severe and persistent diarrhea, which may be accompanied by
blood and mucus, and which may be associated with changes diagnosed as 'psendomembra-
nous colitis,' has been reported in association with the administration of Cleocin HCL
(clindamycin HCL hydrate)." Id. at 852.
193. Id. at 853.
194. Id at 855-56, (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 275, at 668-69 (2d ed. 1972)).
195. Id.
196. Id The court noted that feasibility was not an issue in the case. Id. at 856. Addi-
tionally the court stated, "[i]f feasibility were to be found at issue in the case at bar, it is
difficult to imagine a situation where it would not arguably be in issue." Id. at 855.
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sidered the possible impact of granting free admission in situations not
expressly covered by the rule.
If the express exceptions mentioned in rule 407 should not be allowed to
subvert the congressional policy of encouraging remedial action, it is clear
that the use of remedial evidence for purposes not mentioned in the rule
should not be allowed to defeat congressional intent. But because the ex-
ceptions stated in rule 407 are "illustrative and not exhaustive,"' 197 as the
Werner court conceded, unmentioned purposes present a complicated
problem.
In Werner, the plaintiff noted'98 rule 407 does not mention the use of
remedial measures to prove strict liability.' 99 Although some courts have
used the rule's silence to conclude that strict liability must be an unstated
exception, the Fourth Circuit was not so hasty.2" Keeping in mind the
precept that admission could defeat the goal of encouraging repairs, the
Werner court emphasized that the Federal Rules of Evidence contain
many "gaps" and that Congress, by enacting the rules, did not intend to
197. Id. at 856. See also supra note 158. The court considered possible exceptions for
strict liability, 628 F.2d at 856-57, for products liability, id. at 857-58, for breach of warranty,
causation and punitive damages, id. at 858-59. The sheer number of possible exceptions to
the rule against admission of subsequent remedial measures supports the court's conclusion
that free admission of evidence on the grounds of exception would subvert the rule's purpose
of encouraging repairs. See Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs,
1972 DUKE L.J. 837, 845. The author stated:
Limitations on the applicability of the rule excluding evidence of subsequent re-
pairs and improvements have effectively limited the benefit which the defendant
derives from the general exclusionary rule. Instead of excluding most evidence of
subsequent repairs, courts appear willing, if not eager, to admit such evidence.
With the rule so restricted in its application and subject to many exceptions, it will
be a rare plaintiff who cannot find a justification for introducing evidence of subse-
quent repairs, particularly when several defendants have been joined in the action.
The rule no longer appears to be one of general exclusion; rather, the rule for
evidence of subsequent repairs may now be a positive rule of admissibility subject
only to the exception that evidence of subsequent repair is admissible unless it is
used against the party who made the repair as an admission of his negligence.
Id (citations omitted) (emphasis in the original). While this analysis may have been some-
what premature in sounding the death knell for the rule against admission of subsequent
remedial measures, it suggests the danger of allowing too many exceptions to the rule.
198. Werner, 628 F.2d at 856.
199. FED. R. EvID. 407.
200. Compare Werner, 628 F.2d at 856 ("The mere fact that Rule 407 by its terms only
excludes evidence of subsequent precautionary measures to prove negligence or culpable
conduct does not necessarily mean that the evidence should be admissible to prove strict
liability.") with Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793 (concluding that rule 407 is "by its terms, confined
to cases involving negligence or other culpable conduct. The doctrine of strict liability by its
very nature, does not include these elements."). See also Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv-
ice, Inc., 52 U.S.L.W. 2157, 2158 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding that subsequent remedial meas-
ures are admissible for "any purpose" besides demonstrating the defendant's negligence).
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"wipe out the years of common law development in the field of evidence
.. "201 Therefore, in filling rule 407's omission with regard to strict lia-
bility, the Fourth Circuit considered whether there was any reason to dis-
tinguish strict liability from the stated forbidden purposes of negligence
and culpable conduct.2 °2 A thorough examination of that question, the
court reasoned, is the only way to determine whether the policy behind the
rule would be violated by making a new exception for strict liability.
20 3
To determine whether a distinction should be drawn between remedial
measures offered to prove strict liability and remedial measures offered to
prove negligence or culpable conduct, the Fourth Circuit first examined
the character of the conduct involved.21 "Culpable conduct," the court
stated, involves acts of a party that are more blameworthy than simple
negligence.2 °5 In contrast, the court noted, strict liability is a concept ap-
plied when a party's acts are less deserving of blame compared to the con-
duct of one who is negligent. 2°6 Following the reasoning of the court, it
cannot be argued that the acts of one who may be strictly liable are more
noxious than those of one who has been negligent or has engaged in culpa-
ble conduct. Therefore, the court unanimously concluded that if Congress
and the common law were willing to offer some protection to one accused
of the greater infractions to achieve policy objectives, "the result should be
no different" in strict liability, where the conduct involved is "technically
less blameworthy.,
217
Prior courts that have held the rule to be inapplicable to strict liability
failed to consider the character of the conduct; consequently, their conclu-
sions that Congress intended to exclude strict liability from coverage may
201. Werner, 628 F.2d at 856 (citing S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 1, at 411-
13).
202. Werner, 628 F.2d at 856.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 856-57.
205. Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1978), the Werner court noted that
culpable conduct "implies that the act or conduct spoken of is reprehensible or wrong, but
not that it involves malice or a guilty purpose.").
206. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857.
207. Id. Butsee Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 126, 528 P.2d at 1155, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Clark, J.,
dissenting) (concluding that the phrase "culpable conduct" includes any breach of a legal
duty, and in the case of strict liability, culpable conduct includes breach of a duty to refrain
from marketing a defective product). Judge Clark reaches the same ultimate conclusion:
that the rule against admission of subsequent repairs applies to strict liability. But his
method of reaching that conclusion is to define culpable conduct to include the concept of
strict liability. Id. See also Hall, 688 F.2d at 1066 (concluding that "culpable conduct"
includes operation of a vessel in an unseaworthy condition, an act for which the actor may
be held strictly liable).
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have been somewhat misguided.2"' Certainly, these earlier decisions may
have been correct in concluding that "culpable conduct" is not equivalent
to conduct for which one may be held strictly liable.20 9 Similarly, courts
that have admitted remedial evidence in strict liability cases may have
been correct in determining that the rule against admission of remedial
evidence can serve "as a shield against potential liability.21° Nevertheless,
if Congress intended to provide a "shield" for parties accused of more
blameworthy conduct, it is apparent that the less blameworthy conduct
involved in strict liability should be equally protected if it would serve the
policy of encouraging repairs.
With a view toward encouraging safety-improving actions, the Fourth
Circuit focused on whether distinctions between negligence and strict lia-
bility would warrant different treatment under rule 407.21' The rationale
behind the rule, the court explained, is that people generally will not take
actions that can be used against them.212 Under negligence theory, the
court noted, the central issue is the defendant's conduct, and the focus is
on the defendant himself. Under strict liability, however, the issue is the
dangerousness of the product, with the focus on the product.213 But, the
Werner court said, that distinction is "hypertechnical" because "the suit is
against the manufacturer, not against the product," regardless of theory.2 4
Therefore, the court concluded, the policy of encouraging remedial action
by excluding repair evidence should be served as effectively in strict liabil-
ity as in negligence:215 in neither case does the manufacturer want to be
208. See discussion ofAult, Robbins, and Farner, supra text accompanying notes 33-69.
209. Aul, 13 Cal. 3d at 118, 528 P.2d at 1150-51, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15; Robbins, 552
F.2d at 793, 795; Farner, 562 F.2d at 527 n.17. But see supra note 207.
210. See, e.g., Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 120-22, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16;
Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793 n.10 (quoting Au/).
211. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857;butsee Ault, 13 Cal. 3d at 120-21, 558 P.2d at 1151-52, 117
Cal. Rptr. at 815-16;Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793 n.10 (quotingAult);seealsoAult 13 Cal. 3d at
120 n.4, 528 P.2d at 1152 n.4, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 816 n.4.
212. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857.
213. Id This distinction may actually strengthen, rather than weaken, the argument that
rule 407 should apply to strict liability. It is precisely because the focus is on the defendant's
conduct in a negligence action that the defendant's later conduct is, to some degree, relevant
to the issue of past conduct. As the advisory committee noted, it is possible to infer that a
person was negligent in the past from his later conduct. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory commit-
tee note. But, in the strict liability situation, because the focus is on the product itself, the
manufacturer's conduct does not convey any information about the product itself. Phrased
another way, the manufacturer's conduct is relevant only to what the manufacturer thought
about his product, and does not demonstrate anything about the actual safety of the product.
214. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857.
215. To further bolster its argument that no distinction should be made between cases
based on negligence theory and those based on strict liability theory, the Werner court ex-
amined the two concepts in the context of a failure-to-warn case. Id at 858. Under either
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found liable, and the assumption that he will not take steps that can be
used against him remains undisturbed. 16 That conclusion, however, did
not end the Werner court's extensive analysis. The court went on to con-
sider whether any other factors might alter the rule's assumptions.
Noting that some courts have concluded that a mass-producer does not
need the impetus of the rule against admission of subsequent repairs to
encourage him to improve product safety, 217 the Werner court examined
the validity of that argument.21 s The argument is based on the concept
that the threat of additional law suits would give the mass-producer suffi-
cient incentive to take subsequent remedial actions.2 9 The flaw in this
theory, the court noted, the plaintiff was focusing on the issue of the adequacy of the warn-
ing. Id If the warning was found to be adequate, the defendant would be neither negligent
nor strictly liable, the court stated. Id Furthermore, the court stated, because this case in-
volved failure to warn of an unavoidably dangerous drug, there was no difference in the
standard for liability under negligence and strict liability. Id. Under either theory, the bal-
ancing test to be applied by the jury is essentially the same: in negligence, the jury balances
the burden of the risk against the gravity and probability of the harm; with an unavoidably
dangerous drug, the jury must weigh the benefits of the drug against the seriousness and
frequency of its undesirable consequences to determine whether the drug is made defective
by the absence of a particular warning. Compare Judge Learned Hand's statement of this
balancing test as applied to negligence in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947) with Werner, 628 F.2d at 858 n.4 and accompanying text (quoting RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k) (suggesting the balancing test to be
applied to strict liability cases involving unavoidably dangerous products).
216. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857.
217. See, e.g., Au/t, 13 Cal. 3d at 113, 528 P.2d at 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 812.
218. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857-58.
219. Au/t, 13 Cal. 3d at 120-22, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16. The Au/t
court reasoned that the owner or maker of a single instrument of injury, such as an unstable
staircase, might be deterred from making a postaccident repair if the repair could be used as
evidence of his previous negligence. Id at 120, 528 P.2d at 1151, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815. But,
the Au/t court stated that although the rule against admission may fulfill this antideterrent
function in the typical negligence action, the provision plays no comparable role in the prod-
ucts liability field. Id The Au/t court concluded:
When the context is transformed from a typical negligence setting to the modern
products liability field, however, the "public policy" assumptions justifying this
evidentiary rule are no longer valid. The contemporary corporate mass producer
of goods, the normal products liability defendant, manufactures tens of thousands
of units of goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest that such a producer will
forego making improvements in its product, and risk innumerable additional law-
suits and the attendant adverse effect upon its public image, simply because evi-
dence of adoption of such improvement may be admitted in an action founded on
strict liability for recovery on an injury that preceded the improvement. In the
products liability area, the exclusionary rule of section 1151 does not affect the
primary conduct of the mass producer of goods, but serves merely as a shield
against potential liability. In short, the purpose of section 1151 is not applicable to
a strict liability case and hence its exclusionary rule should not be gratuitously
extended to that field.
This view has been advanced by others. It has been pointed out that not only is
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argument, the Werner court explained, is that it assumes a defect in the
product. 220 Futhermore, it completely ignores the situation where a manu-
facturer decides to improve his nondefective product.22 1 Where the earlier
version of the product is not defective, the court said, the manufacturer
who takes the precautionary measure of improving his product after an
accident risks the imposition of liability as a result of that decision.222
Clearly, this would violate rule 407's public policy of not deterring reme-
dial action.223 Furthermore, the Werner court realized, in such situations,
the evidence of improvement "in no way supports an inference that the
initial version of the product was defective. 224 This, of course, relates to
the second ground for excluding remedial evidence: improvements, even
those furthering safety, are not in fact an admission of prior fault.
225
Thus, the intrinsic flaw in the argument that mass producers should be
the policy of encouraging repairs and improvements of doubtful validity in an ac-
tion for strict liability since it is in the economic self interest of a manufacturer to
improve and repair defectiveproducts, but that the application of the rule would be
contrary to the public policy of encouraging the distribution of mass-produced
goods to market safer products. (Note, Products Liability and Evidence of Subse-
quent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837, 845-52.)
Id at 120, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16, 528 P.2d at 1151-52 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
This passage was quoted in full by Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793 n.10.
220. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857. Compare Ault quoted supra note 219.
221. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857.
222. Id
223. See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
224. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857. The example given in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402A, comment k (1965) is a situation where the product is not defective but might be
improved. The Pasteur treatment for rabies, the comment notes, "is not defective, nor is it
unreasonably dangerous," despite its "very serious and damaging consequences" when in-
jected. Id (emphasis in original) It must, however, be accompanied by a proper warning of
the danger and it must be properly prepared. Id. The comment notes that because the dis-
ease itself "invariably leads to a dreadful death" the risks involved in the treatment are
justified. Id Thus a manufacturer of the treatment may market it without legal liability for
the product's injurious side effects. Id But, considering that example, it is clear that if scien-
tists were to someday discover a miraculous advance in the Pasteur treatment that would rid
the treatment of its dangerous side effects while retaining its beneficial impact, such an im-
provement would no doubt increase the safety of the product. In such a case, the improve-
ment would not support an inference that the initial version of the Pasteur treatment was
defective. Yet, if evidence of the later improvement were admissible, then all patients who
suffered injury from the side effects of the earlier treatment could use the subsequent im-
provement to prove a prior defect. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1977).
225. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note. Every product improvement made
after an injury "is not in fact an admission, since the conduct is equally consistent with
injury by mere accident. ... See FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note. Similarly,
every postaccident improvement does not mean the preaccident, unimproved product was
defective and unreasonably dangerous by virtue of the absence of the subsequent improve-
ment. In fact, in the Werner case, although there was a postaccident improvement in the
product and although evidence of the subsequent improvement was admitted, the jury found
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treated different from other defendants runs counter to rule 407 on the
dual considerations of public policy and relevance. Rule 407 does not as-
sume that only those eventually found liable need the protection of exclu-
sion to encourage repairs. Nor does the rule assume that every individual
sued for negligence was in fact negligent. It is apparent that, even in situa-
tions not involving mass-produced products, public-minded individuals
are likely to correct dangerous situations. Similarly, as the drafters of rule
407 realized, self-interest is often a motivating factor.226 While the non-
negligent person may be reluctant to take remedial measures that can later
be used against him, the negligent person may decide to repair to avoid a
second suit.227 Yet, the rule makes no distinction based on whether a de-
fendant was actually negligent. 228 Thus, there appears to be no basis for
concluding that a mass producer is any more self-interested than any other
defendant.
In considering the implications of creating a new exception for mass
producers, the court again noted that unstated exceptions should no more
be allowed to defeat congressional intent than should express excep-
tions.229 An exception for mass producers, the court stressed, could "effec-
tively override Rule 407" because it would encompass all products liability
cases.230 Courts adopting the mass producer exception failed to offer a
basis for concluding that a manufacturer sued under strict liability would
be any more inclined to take subsequent remedial measures without bene-
fit of the rule than would a producer sued under negligence theory.23 Yet,
as Werner emphasized, Congress made no exceptions for negligence ac-
tions brought against manufacturers of mass-produced products.
When Congress adopted rule 407,232 plaintiffs had been bringing prod-
ucts liability suits against manufacturers under negligence theory for many
that the pre-accident product was "not unreasonably dangerous," and thus not defective.
Werner, 628 F.2d at 860.
226. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note.
227. ButseeAult, 13 Cal. 3d at 120-22, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-16. The
court assumed that only a person sued in strict liability would repair to avoid a second suit,
but it did not offer any reason for distinguishing between negligence and strict liability. Id
228. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note and text. Clearly, such a distinction
would be impossible to make since it is only after the trial that a defendant can be deter-
mined to have been negligent. Similarly, a defendant cannot be found to have manufac-
tured a defective product until the trial has concluded.
229. Werner, 628 F.2d at 857.
230. Id As was the case in Werner, a products liability case may be brought under
negligence theory, strict liability theory and warranty theory. Id. at 851.
231. Id at 858. SeeAult, 13 Cal. 3d at 120-22, 528 P.2d at 1151-52, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 815-
16; Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793 n.10.
232. The Federal Rules of Evidence were enacted in 1975. Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat.
1926 (1975).
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years.233 Strict liability, in contrast, was a relatively new concept.
23 4 If
Congress, then, had intended to exclude any cases involving mass-pro-
duced products, negligence cases involving such products would have been
a likely target for exception. Indeed, as the Werner court discerned, Con-
gress specifically decided to exclude evidence of remedial measures to
prove negligence, regardless of whether the item in question was mass-
produced.2 35 Thus, the fact of mass production should not warrant admis-
sion of remedial measure in strict liability actions.
The reasoning of Judge Widener's opinion in Werner provides a sound
basis for examining proposed exceptions to rule 407 while ensuring that
the goal of encouraging remedial measures will be promoted. Working
from the premise that unstated exceptions should not be granted more
freely than express exceptions, 236 the Werner method compares the pro-
posed exception with the forbidden purposes. 237 The focus is on whether
distinctions can be made either on the grounds of the character of the con-
duct or the applicability of the rule's theory that exclusion will encourage
repairs. 238 Additionally, the approach emphasizes that Congress did not
assume fault in deciding to exclude remedial evidence offered to prove
negligence. 239 Finally, the Werner method considers whether conclusions
reached on the proposed exception would apply with equal force to negli-
gence or culpable conduct. 2 ° This thorough approach ensures that new
exceptions will not violate rule 407's public policy mandate to promote
added safety.
233. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), is considered
the forerunner of products liability actions based on negligence. In that case, Justice Car-
dozo held that a plaintiff could recover for injuries caused by the negligence of a manufac-
turer despite the lack of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant manufacturer.
Additionally, the case held that lacking privity, the plaintiff did not need to show that cars in
general are "inherently dangerous." Rather, the plaintiff merely needed to show that the
product was "reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made
. . . "Id at 389, III N.E. at 1053.
234. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697
(1963), is considered by many legal authorities to be the seminal case of modern strict prod-
ucts liability theory. That case stated that the purpose of strict liability for defective products
"is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who
are powerless to protect themselves." 1d at 62-63, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
235. Werner, 628 F.2d at 858.
236. Id. at 856.
237. Id at 856-57.
238. Id. at 857.




B. Cann v. Ford Motor Co.
One year after the Werner decision, the Second Circuit had the opportu-
nity to examine the Fourth Circuit's approach. In adopting the Werner
approach, the Second Circuit held, in Cann v. FordMotor Co. ,241 that the
policy of promoting safety requires exclusion of remedial measures in
strict liability cases. 242 The probative value of the evidence must be
weighed against the dangers of prejudice and confusion, the court said.243
The decision thus addressed rule 407's dual concerns of public policy and
low probative value.
The Cann case arose when a 1976 Mercury Marquis slipped unexpect-
edly into reverse. 244 Claiming that the vehicle's transmission was defective
because it could appear to be in "park" when it was actually "hung up"
between gears, the plaintiffs brought an action under negligence, strict lia-
bility, and warranty theories.243 A unanimous Second Circuit rejected the
plaintiffs' argument24 6 that remedial measures should have been admitted
because rule 407 does not apply to strict liability theory.24 7
The Cann court noted the division among the circuits over whether rule
407 applies to strict liability.248 The court emphasized, however, that rule
407's failure to specifically mention strict liability does not require restrict-
ing application of the rule to subsequent remedial measures taken in negli-
gence and culpable conduct cases. 249 Where the rules are silent, the court
stated, common law principles must be applied to fill the "gaps" and
achieve the policy objectives mandated by Congress.25° Omissions in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Cann recognized, must not be utilized to defeat
congressional purpose.251' Thus, following the Werner approach, the court
considered whether the congressional purpose of not deterring remedial
measures is applicable to defendants sued in strict liability cases.252
241. 658 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2036 (1982).
242. Id. at 60.
243. Id at 59. See also FED. R. EvID. 403; Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637
F.2d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1980).
244. Cann, 658 F.2d at 56.
245. Id; see also id. at 56 n. 1.
246. Id. at 59.
247. Id at 60.
248. Id. at 59. Compare Farner, 562 F.2d 518 and Robbins, 552 F.2d 788 with Oberst, 640
F.2d 863 and Werner, 628 F.2d 848, 857 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
249. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60 (citing Werner, 628 F.2d at 856; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN,
supra note 1, at 411-13. Contra Herndon, 52 U.S.L.W. 2158 (rule 407 does not apply where
the evidence is offered for any purpose other than to prove negligence).
250. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60.
251. Id; accord Werner, 628 F.2d at 856-58.
252. Cann, 658 F.2d at 59-60.
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As many courts have found,2 53 the purpose underlying rule 407 is to
ensure that the threat of legal liability will not discourage individuals from
taking remedial measures.254 The Second Circuit noted in Cann that the
rule embodies a "common sense recognition" that people avoid actions
that can later be used against them. 2"1 The fear that people will refrain
from doing anything that increases the probability of losing a lawsuit, the
court realized, prompted enactment of rule 407.256 Recognizing this ra-
tionale, the Second Circuit then examined the potential effect of allowing
admission of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases.
In the context of rule 407, the Cann decision held, the theoretical distinc-
tions between negligence and strict liability are not controlling.257 Con-
versely, the court found that the defendant's concern over the legal
consequences of repair would be the same under either negligence or strict
liability.258 In both cases, admission of remedial evidence would be dam-
aging to the defendant, the court said.259 Under either theory, the court
added, the admission of damaging evidence could mean that "the defend-
ant must pay the judgment., 26" Therefore, the court concluded, the policy
of encouraging remedial actions by excluding damaging use of remedial
measures is applicable to a defendant sued under either theory.26'
C The Trend Toward Exclusion: Achieving the Goal
Rule 407 seeks to motivate defendants to repair without contemplating
the legal ramifications of their remedial acts.262 It does so by simply re-
moving the threat of damaging uses of the evidence. 263 Admitting evidence
of subsequent remedial measures in strict liability cases while excluding it
in negligence cases would, as the Cann opinion stated, leave a "gap"9 in
253. See, e.g., Werner, 628 F.2d at 857; Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793.
254. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60; see also FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
255. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60.
256. Id
257. Id But see Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793.
258. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60 (the defendant must be "equally concerned regardless of the




262. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
263. Id The rule provides for automatic exclusion for negligence and culpable conduct
and for feasibility, ownership and control when those issues are not controverted. It further
requires a balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the dangers of prejudice,




rule 407 through which one "extremely damaging"" and "highly prejudi-
cial"265 use of the evidence could enter.266
The initial impact of ignoring rule 407's precept in strict liability cases
would be to create uncertainty. A manufacturer who had not yet been sued
could not determine the legal ramifications of his remedial acts until he
knew the theory of the prospective suit. 267 The more subversive impact
would be to delay or deter remedial steps in general.268 In Cann, the court
recognized that plaintiffs "frequently" elect to bring an action under both
negligence and strict liability theories.269 If the evidence could be used on
a strict liability count, then a defendant might refrain from taking reme-
dial measures. 270 A defendant would only be able to repair with the assur-
ance that the evidence would not be used against him if negligence were
the only count against him. But, the possibility of delay might persist even
after the suit is filed because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow
for liberal amendment of pleadings.27' Indeed, under these rules, a strict
liability count could be asserted at almost any time, even in the middle of
the trial.272 Uncertainty over the cause of action and, consequently, over
the admissibility of remedial evidence, then, might discourage remedial
measures.
The risk of chilling a defendant's remedial actions by holding out the
threat of admissibility on a strict liability count, however, depends upon
whether admission on that count could cause a parallel threat of liability.
Thus, in Cann the Second Circuit began its consideration of the eviden-
tiary issue with the assertion that courts must evaluate postaccident warn-
ings and postaccident design modifications under rule 403's balancing test.
Admissibility, the court noted, is controlled by whether the limited proba-
tive value of the evidence is outweighed by "the danger of unfair prejudice
264. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60 (citing Bauman, 621 F.2d at 233).
265. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60 (citing Smyth, 529 F.2d at 804).
266. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60.
267. See, e.g., Herndon, 52 U.S.L.W. at 2158 (holding that rule 407 does not apply to
strict liability cases, the Tenth Circuit held that a limiting instruction should be 'used where
the evidence is inadmissible on a negligence count and admissible on a strict liability count).
268. See Cann, 658 F.2d at 60. Since the statute of limitations is the only time concern
for the prospective plaintiff, it is possible, depending upon the jurisdiction, that a suit could
be filed many months after an accident.
269. Id.
270. See id.
271. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 15.
272. FED. R. Civ. PRO. 15(b) (amendments to conform to the evidence may be made "at
any time, even after judgment").
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and confusion. '27 3 Although the court ultimately based its decision to up-
hold exclusion of the evidence on the grounds that rule 407 does apply to
strict liability, it is clear that the damaging nature of the evidence played a
significant role in the court's conclusion.274 It is precisely because the evi-
dence is "extremely damaging" and "highly prejudicial" that a defendant
"must be equally concerned" over its possible admission, regardless of the
theory of the suit.27 Clearly, the Cann court would not have concluded
that the threat of admission on a strict liability count could deter remedial
action if there were no risks posed by admission.276
The risks posed for the defendant, then, and the ultimate threat of liabil-
ity in an eventual trial are really the essence of why rule 407 should in-
clude strict liability. The Cann court appeared to emphasize this point by
expressly using the balancing test of rule 403.277 In contrast, the Werner
court may have relied on the unmistakably damaging nature of the evi-
dence when used as proof of defect in strict liability to complete its logical
inference that admission would "overwhelm" the rule.278 Thus, both
courts found, there is no distinction between negligence and strict liability
that justifies different treatment of subsequent remedial measures under
these theories.
The general structure of rule 407 supports the conclusion that the dam-
aging nature of remedial evidence requires exclusion. As the advisory
committee note states, where remedial evidence is not automatically ex-
cluded, the damaging nature and the limited probative value of the evi-
dence must be considered.279 Unlike the California rule considered by the
Ault court,280 rule 407 does not automatically admit evidence when it is
not offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct. 28' Indeed, in rule
273. Cann, 658 F.2d at 59 (quoting Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87,
94 (2d Cir. 1980); see also FED. R. EVID. 403 & FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
274. See Cann, 658 F.2d at 59-60. Compare Herndon, 52 U.S.L.W. at 2157-58 where the
Tenth Circuit did not balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
impact, and thus reached a different result than it did the Second Circuit in Cann.
275. Cann, 658 F.2d at 60.
276. See id
277. Id at 59-60; accord Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 888 (the use of rule 407 should
conform to the policy expressed in rule 403).
278. See Werner, 628 F.2d at 857.
279. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note. But see Herndon, 52 U.S.L.W. at 2157-
58 in which the Tenth Circuit failed to consider the damaging nature of the evidence. In
that case, the Tenth Circuit merely noted that evidence of a subsequent remedial measure is
relevant to the issue of defect because it is "possible" to draw an inference of defect from the
repair.
280. Aut, 13 Cal. 3d at 113, 528 P.2d at 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 812 (ruling on CAL. EvID.
CODE § 1151 (West 1966)). See supra note 34 for text of code.
281. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee note.
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407, Congress appears to have determined that any use of the evidence
that could threaten a defendant with liability could deter remedial action.
The principles enunciated in Werner and Cann appear to signal a more
exhaustive approach to the issue of rule 407's applicability to strict liability
cases. In concluding that remedial measures taken in strict liability cases
fall within the scope of rule 407, earlier courts relied heavily on the low
probative value of the evidence.2" 2 Although low probative value alone
may be a sufficient basis for exclusion, consideration of probative value is
an insufficient basis for admission. Before admitting evidence of remedial
measures, courts must go on to determine whether admission would deter
remedial measures, thus addressing rule 407's policy concerns. The deci-
sions of the Second and Fourth Circuit offer an effective elucidation of the
policy considerations underlying rule 407 in the setting of strict liability.
In examining the policy of encouraging repairs, these courts expose the
faulty reasoning of cases finding the rule inapplicable to strict liability.
Although the threat of additional lawsuits may be a sufficient incentive to
repair defective products, that threat cannot be asumed when the product
is not defective. Furthermore, remedial evidence is no less damaging to a
defendant in the context of strict liability than in a negligence setting.
Clearly, then, the threat of admission can deter remedial measures in gen-
eral. If courts must guard against subverting congressional policy objec-
tives in the context of rule 407's express exceptions, then they must be
equally vigilant where the proposed exception would sneak through a
"gap" in the rule.
The influence of this valid reasoning is likely to be extensive. Many
circuits have already found rule 407 applies to strict liability, based on
relevance concerns alone.283 The policy arguments simply offer those cir-
cuits an additional reason for excluding remedial measures in strict liabil-
ity. Undecided circuits should and probably will consider the policy
concerns so well stated in Werner and Cann.284 Even the Eighth Circuit,
282. See, e.g., Bauman, 621 F.2d at 230; supra notes 168-80 and accompanying text; see
also Foster, 621 F.2d at 721.
283. See. e.g., the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Bauman, 621 F.2d 230; the Third Circuit's
opinion in Josephs, 677 F.2d at 990-91 and the most recent case on the issue, the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 885-89.
284. See the Sixth Circuit's recent opinion on this issue in Hall, 688 F.2d at 1062. In that
case the Sixth Circuit expressly adopted the Werner-Cann approach. Id at 1066-68. Adding
to the Werner court's policy arguments on the issue, the Sixth Circuit also held that "culpa-
ble conduct" as used in rule 407 may include conduct for which a party is held strictly liable.
Id at 1066. See also Grenada Steel, 695 F.2d at 887-88, adopting the Werner-Cann holding
based on the grounds of policy and relevance, id., and noting that the Eighth Circuit stands
alone in refusing to apply rule 407 to strict products liability cases. Id at 886. But see
Herndon, 52 U.S.L.W. at 2157-58. In Herndon, the Tenth Circuit dismissed the policy argu-
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often cited for its decisions admitting remedial evidence in strict liability
cases, recently cited Cann and noted the development in this area.285 Re-
fusing to insist on its earlier rulings, the Eighth Circuit has simply in-
structed lower courts to rely on the developing law then controlling and to
exercise their discretion in this "changing" area. If the signal of change
was missed when the Fourth Circuit decided the issue, then the Second
Circuit's assent and the Eighth Circuit's apparent acquiescence make it
clear.
VI. CONCLUSION
The unmistakable trend toward exclusion of remedial measures in strict
liability cases is a welcome development. The federal circuits have been
divided on this issue for too long. By addressing the policy objectives es-
tablished by Congress, the Fourth and Second Circuits have made even-
tual uniformity among the circuits possible. Moreover, uniformity is
desirable, for uncertainty can undermine the goal of encouraging safer
products and defeat the purpose behind the rule.
Barbara Strong Goss
ments which favor exclusion of subsequent repairs in strict liability cases. "The policy argu-
ment underpinning rule 407 cannot logically be extended to strictly liable defendants-the
reasonableness of their conduct is not at issue, so there is no reason to exclude evidence of
their conduct." Id at 2157. But this argument ignores the possibility that admission of the
evidence will deter remedial action.
285. McGowne, 672 F.2d at 665, rev'd on other grounds.
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